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THE MERITS OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING

Brian Charles Lea*

ABSTRACT
When can a litigant assert someone else’s rights in federal court? The courts
currently purport to adhere to a “prudential” justiciability rule barring such “thirdparty standing.” But the Supreme Court has devised exceptions—jus tertii standing
and First Amendment overbreadth—under which courts can ignore that rule. The
Court has never explained the source of that remarkable judicial power to choose what
rights litigants can assert. The doctrine of third-party standing is, in short, an undertheorized muddle. Thankfully, the Court suggested in its 2014 decision in Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., that it might soon try to bring
order to its third-party standing jurisprudence.
Drawing on Lexmark, this Article offers a fresh and timely account of thirdparty standing doctrine. It argues that the rule barring assertion of third-party rights
has nothing to do with prudence and justiciability. Rather, it is best understood as
going to the merits of the parties’ dispute, in that it concerns the substantive issue of
whether a litigant can establish the grounds of a claim or defense. As a merits doctrine, the rule barring assertion of third-party rights appropriately requires courts to
defer to limits placed on substantive rights by the lawmakers who created them. That
conclusion raises serious questions concerning the viability of the jus tertii standing
and overbreadth exceptions. This Article argues that jus tertii standing doctrine can
survive, but only if cabined to situations in which recognition of an implied right
belonging to the litigant is necessary to effectuate the design of the lawmakers who
created the asserted third-party right. The overbreadth doctrine, however, has no place
in a world in which courts must defer to lawmakers concerning the scope of substantive rights. But the long-dormant doctrine of jus tertii inseverability, which is
grounded in lawmakers’ intentions, could fill some of the void left by the overbreadth
doctrine’s demise.
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INTRODUCTION
Say you are injured by the operation of a statute that violates someone else’s
rights. Can you assert that third person’s rights in court? It turns out that the doctrines that answer such third-party standing questions are an undertheorized muddle.
As things stand now, the federal courts purport to adhere to a general rule prohibiting
litigants from asserting rights that “belong to” someone else. But the Supreme Court
has developed exceptions that often permit courts to ignore that general rule. Thus,
under the “jus tertii standing” exception, the Court has held that a law firm could challenge a criminal forfeiture statute on the ground that it impermissibly limited the
ability of defendants to retain their desired counsel, even though the firm’s client
consented to the forfeiture order.1 The Court also has held, however, that attorneys
could not challenge a law barring the appointment of appellate counsel for some indigent defendants, even though the attorneys had long engaged in state-paid appellate
1

See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623–24 n.3 (1989).

2015]

THE MERITS OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING

279

representation of indigent defendants and affected defendants supported the attorneys’
suit.2 And, under the “overbreadth” exception, the Court routinely permits litigants
to argue that a statute cannot be applied to them because it would violate the First
Amendment rights of third parties if applied to them.3 But the Court has refused to
authorize such a challenge where commercial speech is at issue4 and generally will
not allow such a challenge “outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”5 In
short, sometimes the Court allows litigants to assert “third-party” rights, and sometimes
it does not. That power to choose the rights a litigant is allowed to assert can make all
the difference: a court can pick winners and losers simply by deciding whether the
litigant has “standing” to assert the right of a person not before the court.6
Where does this power come from? Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never
paused to offer a serious answer. The Court has insisted, without further explanation,
that the rule barring assertion of others’ rights is a matter of “prudential standing”—
that is, “a rule of practice” and “self-restraint” developed by the Court—that may
be either applied or ignored as the Court sees fit.7 The resulting difficulties are not
hard to spot. As Professor Monaghan has observed, “[s]erious problems of legitimacy are raised” when courts exercise an “unanalyzed and ungrounded” discretion
to pick and choose the arguments that they will entertain and, thus, to ration access
to the courts.8
Thankfully, the Court might soon try to bring order to its third-party standing
jurisprudence. In its 2014 decision in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.,9 the Court reframed aspects of its prudential standing doctrine.10
In the process, it suggested that it might re-examine whether the rule barring assertion
of third-party rights is a true matter of judicial “prudence,” a matter of judicial power
under Article III, or a matter concerning the merits of a litigant’s claim or defense.11
No less important, the Court expressed unease with the concept of prudential standing
2

See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 131–34 (2004).
See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999).
4
See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481–82 (1989).
5
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
6
Both overbreadth doctrine and jus tertii standing doctrine involve issues of third-party
standing. Jus tertii inseverability is a superficially similar doctrine that has been described
as involving issues of third-party standing, though it is more accurately described as a matter
of first-party standing. See infra notes 75–96 and accompanying text. For clarity’s sake, this
Article will refer, where applicable, specifically to overbreadth doctrine, jus tertii standing
doctrine, and jus tertii inseverability doctrine. The “third-party standing” formulation will
be used where the discussion focuses on either the general ability of litigants to assert legal
rights belonging to others, or the Court’s current, prudential framework for evaluating a
litigant’s assertion of third-party rights.
7
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 257 (1953).
8
Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278–79 (1984).
9
134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
10
See id. at 1386–88.
11
See id. at 1387 n.3.
3
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doctrines.12 Lexmark suggests that the Court wants to clean up this area of the law.
Otherwise, the Court presumably would not have discussed third-party standing in that
case, which presented no such issue.13 In short, the Court seems poised to reconsider
the third-party standing “doctrine’s proper place in the standing firmament” sooner
rather than later, and that reconsideration will occur against the backdrop of the
Court’s discussion of prudential standing in Lexmark.14
This Article seeks to provide guidance on the issues that will take center stage
when that day comes. Specifically, this Article offers a comprehensive account of
third-party standing doctrine, including both the current default rule barring assertion of third-party rights and the exceptions to that rule. Though the need for a coherent theory of third-party standing has been evident for at least fifty years,15 scholars
only intermittently have given the matter sustained attention, and none have done
so in the wake of the Court’s pivotal decision in Lexmark. Moreover, those scholars
who have addressed the matter at greatest length—Professors Richard Fallon, Henry
Monaghan, Robert Sedler, and Marc Rohr—all endorse a robust conception of the
ability of litigants to assert the rights of third parties.16 The appraisal offered here, in
contrast, advocates a cautious judicial approach—an approach in keeping with the
teachings of Lexmark.
12

See id. at 1386–88.
See infra notes 38–52 and accompanying text.
14
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.
15
See Robert Allen Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme
Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1962).
16
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and ThirdParty Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1359–64, 1369 (2000); Monaghan, supra note 8;
Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Standing
and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393 (1981); Robert Allen Sedler,
The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1308
(1982); Sedler, supra note 15, at 601; Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88
HARV. L. REV. 423, 463 (1974); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 434–50 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing third-party standing and expressing general agreement
with Professor Monaghan’s approach). Other scholars have given attention to third-party
standing doctrine, or aspects of it, in the course of discussing other topics. See, e.g., Michael
C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 250–53,
250 n.57 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853,
859–62 (1991); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 243–47
(1988); Alfred Hill, Some Realism About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 647, 666–72 (2002); Alfred Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1082–83 (1997); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:
Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 366–69 (1998);
Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1981); Kermit Roosevelt III,
Valid Rule Due Process Challenges: Bond v. United States and Erie’s Constitutional Source,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 1007–08, 1020 (2013); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 848 (1970).
13
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To develop a comprehensive account of third-party standing, this Article undertakes two inquiries. First, it asks whether the current default rule barring assertion
of third-party rights is best understood as an appropriate exercise of judicial prudence, a result of constitutional constraints on federal court jurisdiction, or a matter
of substantive law governing the merits of particular disputes. That inquiry is necessary because its resolution will dictate whether and when third-party standing
issues must be addressed—for instance, whether they can be waived and whether
they must be resolved before any rulings on the merits. Moreover, it will impact the
continuing viability of the currently accepted exceptions to the rule barring assertion of
third-party rights, which must be judged against and justified by reference to the
background rule against which they operate.
I therefore offer the first thorough examination of the possible ways of understanding the bar against asserting others’ legal rights. I argue that the rule is best understood as going to the merits of a litigant’s claim or defense. To see why, consider
an example. Assume that a newly enacted state law forbids aliens from purchasing
firearms. Assume further that a firearms dealer in a largely immigrant neighborhood
files a federal lawsuit in which it claims that the law violates aliens’ Second Amendment
rights and has caused it to lose business. Nothing in Article III precludes the court
from adjudicating that lawsuit: the dealer’s financial losses constitute remediable
“injury in fact” caused by the new law, and the suit “call[s] for the application of,”17
and thus “aris[es] under,”18 federal law for purposes of Article III. If the court dismisses
the lawsuit on “third-party standing” grounds, that holding would be based on a conclusion concerning the substantive scope of the Second Amendment right—that is,
that the Framers of the Second Amendment created a personal right that protects
individuals, as individuals. That is a merits determination concerning the validity
of the dealer’s Second Amendment claim,19 not an exercise of judicial prudence.
17

Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
19
Now-Judge William Fletcher connected third-party standing doctrine to the merits of
the parties’ dispute in the course of making a broader argument that all standing issues should
be reconceived as merits questions. See Fletcher, supra note 16, at 243–47. Professor Todd
Brown has done the same in the course of arguing that prudential standing doctrines should
be abandoned. See S. Todd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 95, 130–32 (2014). Because Judge Fletcher and Professor Brown do not focus on thirdparty standing doctrine, they understandably do not address important aspects of the thirdparty standing issue that are explored in this Article. As an example, neither Judge Fletcher
nor Professor Brown considers whether Article III’s restriction of federal court jurisdiction
imposes limits on third-party standing, even though the Supreme Court formerly held that
Article III limits the ability of litigants to assert third-party rights in federal court. See infra
notes 53–74, 191–226 and accompanying text. Similarly, neither Judge Fletcher nor Professor
Brown explores the implications of their conclusions for the future of third-party standing
doctrine and, particularly, its overbreadth and jus tertii standing exceptions. Professor Brown
does not discuss those matters at all, see Brown, supra, at 130–32, and Judge Fletcher appears
to assume that both exceptions can be understood in terms of first-party rights, see Fletcher,
18
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Second, I assess whether the overbreadth and jus tertii standing exceptions can
survive once it is recognized that third-party standing doctrine concerns the substance
of asserted rights. Time and again, in a variety of contexts, the Supreme Court has
stressed that federal courts generally lack law-making authority, and that they therefore must defer to the designs of others when it comes to the content of substantive
law.20 As a corollary, federal courts must defer to, and enforce, limitations placed
on rights by the lawmakers who created them. The upshot is that a litigant should
be permitted to assert the rights of third parties only when it can be said that a substantive lawmaker has extended to the litigant a first-party right to do so.
As will be shown, that framework requires that jus tertii standing doctrine be
narrowed—but not abandoned—to reach only those situations in which recognition
of an implied right belonging to the litigant is necessary to effectuate the design of
the lawmakers who created the asserted third-party right. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine, with its sweeping allowance of third-party standing in the First
Amendment context, cannot survive in a world in which courts must defer to lawmakers
concerning the scope of the rights that they create. That said, the long-standing jus
tertii inseverability doctrine could be reinvigorated to fill at least part of the void
left by the (urged) demise of overbreadth doctrine. Jus tertii inseverability doctrine
allows a litigant to argue that a law cannot be applied to her because: (1) other
provisions or applications of the law would violate the rights of third parties; and
(2) the lawmakers who created the challenged law intended that it not apply to anyone if those provisions or applications were invalid. The litigant, in other words, is
claiming that a substantive lawmaker has authorized her to assert rights that belonged
in the first instance to third parties. The litigant is making, in short, a first-party overbreadth challenge.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets the stage. The first Subpart summarizes the two now-accepted aspects of standing doctrine—Article III standing and
prudential standing. The second Subpart discusses the Court’s Lexmark decision.
Part II seeks the best understanding of the rule barring assertion of third-party
rights. The first Subpart offers a historical account of third-party standing law. Building on this history, the second Subpart identifies the different ways in which the rule
barring third-party standing might be understood: as going to judicial prudence, constitutional jurisdiction, or the merits of the parties’ dispute. I argue that the third-party
“standing” bar is best conceptualized as involving the merits of the parties’ dispute,
supra note 16, at 243–47; see also William A. Fletcher, Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce
a Legal Duty?, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277, 282–87 (2013) (suggesting that the Supreme Court
should enjoy flexibility in determining who may assert a right). But a comprehensive account
of third-party standing doctrine must grapple with those issues. I therefore consider them in
this Article. In the process, I make arguments regarding the continuing viability of the
overbreadth and jus tertii standing exceptions that differ dramatically from the positions
suggested by Judge Fletcher’s treatment of third-party standing. See infra Part III.
20
See infra notes 174–90, 227–46 and accompanying text.
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in that it derives from, and requires courts to defer to, limitations placed on the asserted
third-party right by the lawmakers who created that right.
Part III examines whether the overbreadth doctrine can survive once it is recognized that the bar on third-party standing is in reality a merits doctrine. It rejects
past attempts by academic commentators to recast the overbreadth rule in terms of
first-party rights, but also suggests that a reinvigorated judicial attentiveness to jus
tertii inseverability might fill part of the doctrinal void created by abandonment of
overbreadth doctrine.
Part IV considers the continuing vitality of jus tertii standing doctrine. It posits
that the current court-driven, freewheeling approach to jus tertii standing is at odds
with the obligation of courts to defer to lawmakers’ designs concerning the scope
of legal rights. That said, courts should recognize that allowance of jus tertii standing
will effectuate the design of the lawmakers in two narrow situations: (1) when the
first-order right-holder faces a justiciability barrier to securing his right through the
judicial process; and (2) when the government has chosen to regulate the litigant
directly as a means of indirectly regulating the first-order right-holder. In these two
situations, allowance of jus tertii standing vindicates a right—properly inferred from
the legal provision creating the asserted third-party right and the design of the lawmaker who created that provision—that belongs on a first-party basis to the litigant.
Part IV concludes by analyzing—and rejecting—academic attempts to recast jus tertii
standing doctrine more broadly in first-party, substantive-due-process terms.
I. A SUMMARY OF STANDING
Third-party standing law is one piece of a much larger jurisprudence that treats
constitutional and subconstitutional limits on the federal courts’ power to act. This
Part launches the effort to understand third-party standing by offering an overview
of the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine. Subpart A describes the Court’s treatment of both constitutional and prudential standing. Subpart B turns to the Court’s
recent and potentially seminal Lexmark decision.
A. The Two Aspects of Standing Doctrine
“Standing” refers to the right of a particular litigant “to have the court decide
the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”21 As defined by the Court, standing
doctrine is independent of the merits—which is to say that it is independent of the
correctness or incorrectness of a litigant’s claim or defense.22 There are currently
two categories of standing doctrine: constitutional standing and prudential standing.
21
22

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
Id. at 500.
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The first aspect of standing is the doctrine of constitutional standing. The Supreme Court claims that it has “deduced a set of requirements that together make up
the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing’”23 from Article III’s limitation
of the judicial power to “cases” and “controversies.”24 According to the Court, these
requirements limit the federal courts to “adjudication of actual disputes between
adverse parties.”25
To establish Article III standing, a litigant must show three things: “(1) an
‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a
favorable decision.’”26 The Court views these requirements as serving two interrelated goals. First, they keep the federal courts within the proper scope of their
Article III power by preventing them from issuing advisory opinions.27 Second, they
enforce “separation-of-powers principles” by “prevent[ing] the judicial process
from . . . usurp[ing] the powers of the political branches.”28 In both respects, the
Article III standing doctrine serves to keep the federal courts from exceeding their
constitutional role.29 Despite widespread scholarly criticism,30 the Court’s constitutional standing framework is well established.31
The second aspect of standing concerns prudential, rather than constitutional,
limits on judicial action. The Supreme Court has described prudential standing as
comprising “a series of rules under which [it] avoid[s] . . . [some] questions pressed
upon [it] for decision,” “[e]ven in cases concededly within [the Court’s] jurisdiction
under Article III.”32 The Court avoids those questions because it deems the party
pressing them to be “ill-suited to litigate the claims they assert.”33 Although the
23

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
24
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
25
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974).
26
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (alteration in original)
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61).
27
See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
28
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013).
29
See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 159, 170 (2011) (explaining the potential consequences of courts exceeding their
constitutional authority).
30
The criticism fills volumes. For a small sampling of relatively recent criticism, see
Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221, 225–26, 226
n.12 (2008); Laura A. Cisneros, Standing Doctrine, Judicial Technique, and the Gradual
Shift from Rights-Based Constitutionalism to Executive-Centered Constitutionalism, 59 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1089, 1089 & n.1 (2008); Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The
Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 171, 228–34 (2012).
31
See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 29, at 165. I take the current constitutional standing doctrine as a given in this Article.
32
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (quoting Ashwander
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
33
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 119 (1979).
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Court purports not to have “exhaustively defined” prudential standing doctrine, it once
described this body of law as “encompassing . . . at least three broad principles”34:
[1] “the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked”;35
[2] “the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches”;36 and
[3] “the general prohibition on a litigant raising another person’s legal
rights.”37
Recently, however, important shifts have occurred in the law of prudential standing.
As a result, under current law, the Court views only the last of these limits—the
limit on third-party standing—as prudential in nature.
B. Lexmark and the Narrowing of Prudential Standing
In its 2014 Lexmark decision, the Court took it upon itself to reshape the law
of prudential standing.38 It did not need to do so. The case required application of
the zone-of-interests standing limit—a limit sometimes described in terms of “statutory standing.”39 As litigated by the parties and decided by the lower courts, the case
involved only the issue of whether a counter-claimant—Static Control—had statutory standing40 to assert a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act.41 The question
presented asked the Court to resolve a circuit split concerning “the appropriate
analytic framework for determining a party’s [statutory] standing to maintain an
action for false advertising under the Lanham Act.”42

34

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014).
Id. at 1386 (quoting Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 11).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1386–88.
39
See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct.
2199, 2210 (2012).
40
The district court held that Static Control lacked statutory standing to assert a claim
under the Lanham Act. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., Nos. 02-571,
04-84, 2006 WL 7347975, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2006). The Sixth Circuit reversed, also
treating the issue as a matter of statutory standing. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark
Int’l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387, 411 (6th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
41
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
42
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (No. 12-873).
35
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Lexmark thus presented only a narrow issue. The Court, however, seized the
opportunity to “clarify[ ] the nature of the question at issue”43 by broadly re-examining the law of standing. Specifically, the Court, upsetting forty years of precedent,
declared that the statutory standing doctrine did not involve a prudential limit on
judicial action; rather, it involved an aspect of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.44
According to the Court, “[w]hether a plaintiff comes within ‘the “zone of interests”’
is an issue that requires [a court] to determine, using traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”45 The Court, in answering that question, went on to hold
that courts are to defer to the governing body that created the law at issue, which in
Lexmark was Congress.46 As the Court put it, a court “cannot limit a cause of action
that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates” such outcome, “[j]ust
as [it] cannot apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action
that Congress has denied.”47
In addition to reclassifying statutory standing, the Court engaged in a broader
discussion of prudential standing. Of particular significance, it observed that prudential standing limits are “in some tension with [the Court’s] recent reaffirmation
of the principle that ‘a federal court’s “obligation” to hear and decide’ cases within
its jurisdiction ‘is “virtually unflagging.”’”48 And, even though it had nothing to do
with the case at hand, the Court clarified that the bar on generalized grievances
involves a constitutional limit, rather than a prudential standing rule.49
The Court then briefly turned its attention to the lone remaining core prudential
standing doctrine—the bar on third-party standing. The Court acknowledged that
the limitation on asserting third-party legal rights is difficult to classify, and that
most of the Court’s cases have treated it as an aspect of prudential standing.50 The
Court also noted, however, that it had in the past described the third-party standing
issue as “closely related to the [merits] question whether a person in the litigant’s
position will have a right of action on the claim.”51 In the end, the Court concluded
that the third-party standing rule’s “proper place in the standing firmament can await
another day.”52
With respect to the law of third-party standing, Lexmark brings two key points
into focus. First, the Court has declared its readiness to re-examine—and perhaps
43

Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386.
See id. at 1387 & n.4.
45
Id. at 1387 (citations omitted).
46
See id. at 1387–88.
47
Id. at 1388. The Court ultimately held that Static Control’s allegations stated a claim
under the Lanham Act. Id.
48
Id. at 1386 (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)).
49
See id. at 1387 n.3.
50
Id.
51
Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 n.** (1990)).
52
Id.
44
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to rework—the basic principles of third-party standing. Second, that re-examination
will unfold against the backdrop of the Court’s reframing of the law of prudential
standing in the Lexmark opinion itself. In the pages that follow, I offer a fresh account
of third-party standing law that pays heed to the teachings of Lexmark.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE BAR ON THIRD-PARTY STANDING
This Part seeks to unpack what it means for a court to stay its hand because a
litigant lacks “standing” to assert third-party rights. I argue that issues of so-called
third-party standing are best understood as going to the merits of a litigant’s claim
or defense. Subpart A discusses the Supreme Court’s evolving approach to the ability
of litigants to assert rights belonging to others. Subpart B both discusses the various
ways in which the third-party standing bar might be understood and argues that it
is best conceptualized as involving the merits of the litigant’s claim or defense.
A. The Supreme Court’s Evolving Approach to Third-Party Standing
To fully understand the third-party “standing” doctrine, we must consider how
similar issues have been treated in the past. Litigants have long sought to assert
rights belonging in the first instance to others. The Supreme Court’s approach to
such claims has evolved over time. The relevant cases fall into several categories,
which roughly correspond to separate, but overlapping, chronological periods. Each
category of cases will be discussed below. My purpose in recounting this history of
third-party standing is twofold. First, this narrative explains how the Court arrived
at its current, undertheorized third-party standing framework. Second, it provides
clues that help us better understand what the Court means when it says that a litigant cannot assert third-party rights.
1. Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee and Its Progeny
Early in our history, the federal courts addressed the ability of a litigant to raise
others’ legal rights in the course of determining what it meant for a case to “aris[e]
under” federal law within the meaning of Article III.53 Read broadly, that language
could have given the federal courts jurisdiction over every case in which federal law
might play any role.54 As relevant here, the “arising under” language can plausibly
be read as extending the federal judicial power to cases in which a litigant seeks to
assert a third party’s rights under federal law. The Court, however, rejected that
reading of Article III in its 1809 decision in Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee.55
53

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57
DUKE L.J. 263, 306–12 (2007) (cataloguing ratification-era arguments that the federal courts’
“arising under” jurisdiction would reach that far).
55
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348 (1809).
54
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Owings was an ejectment action. The plaintiff claimed a right to possession
under state law pursuant to a patent issued by Maryland, after it confiscated the land
under a state statute that stripped British citizens of their property interests.56 The
defendant (Owings) argued—as permitted under Maryland law—that there was “an
existing title out of the plaintiff” because British mortgagees retained a lien on the
property, which was protected from state confiscation by a provision of the Treaty of
Paris.57 In other words, Owings invoked the British citizens’ rights under a federal
treaty in an attempt to defend his possession of the property. The Maryland courts
rejected that argument.58 Owings sought review on writ of error to the Supreme
Court.59 He based jurisdiction on Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, which permitted
review of state court decisions “where is drawn in question the construction of any
clause of a treaty, and the decision is against the right claimed under such clause of
the treaty.”60
In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.61 According to the Court, the case presented an issue concerning the
meaning of Article III: “Whether the present case [was] a case arising under a
treaty, within the meaning of the constitution.”62 The Court held that the case did
not “aris[e] under a treaty,” even though Owings would have defeated the plaintiff’s
ejectment claim had his interpretation of the treaty prevailed. As the Court explained, treaties create rights, and, “[w]henever a right grows out of, or is protected
by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of the states;
and whoever may have this right, it is to be protected” by the federal courts.63 By
its text, however, the treaty at issue created, as relevant, rights only in British subjects with “any interest in confiscated lands.”64 Thus, Owings’s “title [could not] be
protected by the treaty,” because he did “not contend that his right gr[ew] out of the
treaty.”65 The Court therefore dismissed, holding that Owings could not rely on the
treaty rights of a third party to invoke “arising under” jurisdiction.66
56

Id. at 344.
Id. at 345 (argument of counsel) (quoting Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
art. 5, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 83).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. (paraphrasing 1 Stat. 73, 85–86 (1789)).
61
Id. at 350.
62
Id. at 347. The Court interpreted Section 25 of the Judiciary Act in light of its interpretation of Article III. See id.
63
Id. at 348.
64
See Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 5, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 83. Although the treaty refers here to “all persons,” the context supports the Court’s apparent
conclusion that it protected British subjects and those who sided with Britain during the War.
65
Owings, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 347–48 (emphasis added).
66
Id. at 349–50.
57
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The Court repeatedly relied on Owings and its progeny throughout the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century.67 In doing so, the Court applied
the Judiciary Act, as limited by the Court’s interpretation of Article III’s “arising
under” clause in Owings, to hold that a litigant seeking Supreme Court review of
a state judgment must assert his own rights—not a third party’s rights—under a
provision of the federal Constitution or of a federal statute or treaty.68 These cases
thus reveal the Court’s early recognition that sources of substantive law extend
rights to a limited set of individuals—for instance, British creditors under the treaty
in Owings. And, because the phrase “arising under” does not self-evidently preclude
a litigant’s assertion of rights belonging to a third party, the Court’s refusal to entertain a litigant’s assertion of third-party rights suggested that it recognized a need
to defer to the limited scope accorded rights by the lawmakers who created them.
The Court, however, has now abandoned this narrow reading of Article III’s
“arising under” language. The Court sowed the seeds for this expansion of Article III
“arising under” jurisdiction in its 1824 decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States.69 In Osborn, the Court held that a case “arises under” federal law within the
meaning of Article III whenever an issue of federal law “forms an ingredient of the
original cause.”70 More recent Supreme Court opinions have observed that Osborn
“reflects a broad conception of [Article III] ‘arising under’ jurisdiction, according to
which Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call for the application of federal law.”71 Although those opinions have neither endorsed nor rejected that broadest conception of Article III’s “arising
under” clause,72 they have determined that Article III “arising under” jurisdiction exists, at a minimum, whenever a case necessarily involves a question of federal law.73
67
See, e.g., Miller v. Lancaster Bank, 106 U.S. 542, 544 (1883); Long v. Converse, 91
U.S. 105, 113 (1875); Henderson v. Tennessee, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 311, 319–20 (1850);
Montgomery v. Hernandez, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 129 (1827); see also infra note 91.
68
See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 151 U.S. 81, 98 (1894); Giles v. Little, 134
U.S. 645, 650 (1890); Miller, 106 U.S. at 544–45; Long, 91 U.S. at 106–14; Henderson, 51
U.S. (10 How.) at 323; Fulton v. McAffee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 149, 150–52 (1842);
Hernandez, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 129; see also infra note 91.
69
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
70
Id. at 823.
71
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983).
72
See, e.g., id. at 493.
73
As a result, a federal trial court may exercise Article III jurisdiction if a litigant has
raised a claim or defense necessarily involving a question of federal law. See, e.g., Gunn v.
Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136–37 (1989) (case
falls within scope of Article III “arising under” clause where defendant asserts defense involving question of federal law); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807
(1986); Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 493; see also Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 132 S. Ct. 740,
749 n.9 (2012) (explaining that a state-law claim may “arise under” federal law for purposes of
jurisdictional statute “if the claim requires resolution of significant issues of federal law”).
And the Supreme Court may exercise Article III “arising under” jurisdiction to review a state
court decision addressing an issue of federal law embedded in a state-law claim. See Ohio v.
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Under either of those conceptions of Article III “arising under” jurisdiction, a federal court may adjudicate a case when a litigant’s request for federal court relief is
premised on an assertion of third-party federal rights, as such a case necessarily involves a question of federal law. For confirmation of that point, one need only survey
the many cases in which the Court has adjudicated a petitioner’s jus tertii standing
challenge to state action.74
2. Jus Tertii Inseverability Cases
Long after the Founding, another line of cases arose that has been described as
involving third-party standing issues. I will refer to these cases as “jus tertii inseverability” cases because they are part of a larger body of rulings addressing questions
of severability—that is, whether an unconstitutional provision or application of a
law is severable from the remaining provisions or applications, such that the remaining provisions or applications can continue in effect.75 Given recent cases, one
might think of severability as a remedial matter: a litigant shows that an application
of a law to her violates the Constitution, and the court then explains whether, in
light of that fact, the remainder of the law can still be applied, either to the litigant
or to anyone else.76 However, severability issues can also arise in a way that presents issues closely related to third-party standing.77 In these cases, a litigant argues
that a law cannot be applied to her because: (1) certain of its other provisions or applications would be invalid as applied to third parties; and (2) the remainder of the
law cannot stand without the invalid provisions or applications.
For some eighty years following the Constitution’s ratification, the Court did
not take a focused look at severability issues. Instead, it operated under the assumption that, where only some parts of a statute were invalid, the remainder would be
given “full effect.”78 Only with the rise of complex legislation in the late 1800s79 did
Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 20 (2001); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S.
281, 293–94 (1908).
74
See, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.
42, 54–56 (1992); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411–16 (1991); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 192–97 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976);
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
75
See Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51
HARV. L. REV. 76, 76 (1937).
76
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–04 (2012)
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477 (2010); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006).
77
For a listing of contexts in which severability issues can arise, see John Copeland
Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 209 (1993).
78
Stern, supra note 75, at 79 (quoting Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492,
526 (1829)).
79
See Ryan Scoville, The New General Common Law of Severability, 91 TEX. L. REV.
543, 550 n.33 (2013).

2015]

THE MERITS OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING

291

the Court begin paying serious attention to severability issues, including issues of
jus tertii inseverability.
The end result of that process was the adoption of an approach that looked to
legislative intent to resolve issues of severability. As the Court stated in 1880, “The
point to be determined in all [severability] cases is whether the unconstitutional
provisions are so connected with the general scope of the law as to make it impossible, if they are stricken out, to give effect to what appears to have been the intent
of the legislature.”80 That statement was an early formulation of the long-established
rule: a court must look to the intent of the legislature when determining whether
valid aspects of a statute can be severed from allegedly invalid aspects.81
As a result, a court must consider the intent of the body that created the challenged law in adjudicating a jus tertii inseverability argument. Successful jus tertii
inseverability arguments therefore involve a judicial conclusion that the law-making
body intended the challenged statute not to apply to anyone if certain of its provisions or applications were invalid. Stated differently, successful jus tertii inseverability arguments entail a conclusion that the law-making body that created the
challenged law intended for challengers to be able to assert rights belonging to
others in the first instance.82 These jus tertii inseverability cases thus “are first party
standing cases,”83 in the sense relevant here, because the litigant challenging the law
is asserting legal rights that a relevant law-making body has authorized him to assert.
Even as it solidified the legislative-intent-focused doctrine of severability, the
Court remained largely skeptical of jus tertii inseverability arguments. The Court’s
decision in Clark v. Kansas City84 is typical. In that case, a railroad challenged the
constitutionality of a Kansas statute under which its lands had been incorporated
into, and then taxed by, a city.85 As relevant here, the law excepted lands used for
agricultural purposes, but only if they were not owned by a corporation.86 Though
it owned no agricultural land, the railroad argued that the act violated the Equal
Protection Clause in discriminating against corporations that owned agricultural
lands and that the act therefore could not be applied to it.87 The railroad, in other
words, argued that the act was wholly void because it violated the equal protection
80

Allen v. City of Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84 (1880).
See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 683 n.5 (1987).
82
In a jus tertii inseverability challenge to a state law, the state’s severability law—which
may not look to the legislature’s intent—will determine whether a litigant can assert “thirdparty” rights. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996). The key point, though, is that
for purposes of the challenge, those rights belong to the litigant; he is making a first-party
claim by asserting rights that state law has authorized him to assert. See Monaghan, supra
note 8, at 290.
83
Monaghan, supra note 8, at 290.
84
176 U.S. 114 (1900).
85
Id. at 115.
86
See id.
87
See id. at 117–18.
81
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rights of other corporations—a jus tertii inseverability argument.88 The Court rejected that argument, quoting the Supreme Court of Kansas’s decision to the effect
that “[a] court will not listen to an objection made to the constitutionality of an act
by a party whose rights it does not affect and who has therefore no interest in defeating it.”89 In short, the Court rejected the railroad’s jus tertii inseverability argument,
but it did so without discussing severability.90
Clark, and cases similar to it, can be read in two ways. They can be read as applying a hard-and-fast rule—the precise basis for which is unclear91—categorically
barring litigants from asserting rights that belong to others in the first instance. That
reading, however, does not accurately capture the Court’s view during this period.
The proof lies in the fact that the Court seriously entertained,92 and sometimes
88

Id.
See id. at 118.
90
Id.; see also Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 122–23 (1922) (taking a
similar approach to a jus tertii inseverability challenge to an act of Congress).
91
Some of the cases from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries intertwined their
rejection of a jus tertii inseverability argument with the jurisdictional principle announced
in Owings, but without engaging in an independent discussion of Article III. See supra notes
61–68 and accompanying text. That is, where the litigant asserted a jus tertii inseverability
argument, the Court rejected the argument and dismissed the writ of error in relevant part
based on the principle that a litigant could not rely on another’s federal right to invoke the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138, 148 (1903); Tyler v.
Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 407–10 (1900); Austin v. The Aldermen,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 694, 698–99 (1868). However, in other cases from the era, including Clark,
the Supreme Court rejected jus tertii inseverability arguments without reference to the principle of Owings, holding only that the litigant could not succeed in challenging a statute on the
ground that it violates others’ rights. See, e.g., Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 576
(1915); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 220–21 (1912);
Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 443 (1910); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177
U.S. 28, 43 (1900); Bd. of Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U.S. 305, 306–15 (1881). In cases fitting
the latter description, the Court did not suggest that its decision was based on a prudential
determination that a party should not be permitted to assert another’s rights in pursuit of his
own interests, as opposed to a determination on the merits—that is, a conclusion that the
litigant’s argument failed because he had no claim or defense under the legal provision creating the asserted third-party right. See also Winter, supra note 16, at 1425–33 (arguing that
the rule against third-party standing emerged around the beginning of the twentieth century
as a clearly independent, non-Article III doctrine divorced from the Owings line of cases).
92
By “seriously entertained,” I mean that the Court gave explicit consideration to the issue
of severability in resolving the jus tertii inseverability challenge. See, e.g., Elec. Bond &
Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 433–39 (1938); Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S.
495, 513 (1937); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 288–91 (1924); Bd. of Trade v. Olsen,
262 U.S. 1, 42 (1923); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197, 208 (1917); Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917); El Paso & Ne. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215
U.S. 87, 92–98 (1909); N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 496
(1909) (“[T]he case does not come within that class of cases in which unconstitutional provisions are so interblended with valid ones that the whole act must fall, notwithstanding its constitutionality is challenged by one who might be legally brought within its provisions.”); The
89
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accepted,93 jus tertii inseverability arguments during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. For example, in New York Central Railroad Co. v. White,94 the
Court held that a railroad company could challenge the entirety of New York’s
Workmen’s Compensation Law on the ground that one of its provisions violated the
Fourteenth Amendment rights of employees, because that provision was “an essential part of”—and thus inseverable from—the statutory scheme.95
Given the Court’s willingness during this era to entertain jus tertii inseverability
arguments, cases like Clark are best read as turning (albeit implicitly) on a conclusion of severability.96 It is not that the litigant is categorically barred from making
an inseverability argument based on rights belonging in the first instance to third
parties. Rather, it is that the jus tertii inseverability argument fails on the merits because the statute is severable; the legislature that enacted the challenged statute did
not authorize the litigant to challenge it on the asserted ground. Without that basis
for a first-party challenge, the litigant can only assert whatever first-party rights she
might have by virtue of laws external to the challenged statute.
To be sure, the Court has long97 applied a presumption of severability, pursuant to
which courts assume that a legislature intends maximum severability98 in the absence
Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 494, 499–502 (1908); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. McKendree,
203 U.S. 514 (1906); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); Diamond Glue Co. v. U.S.
Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 617 (1903); Stanley, 105 U.S. at 306; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82, 98–99 (1879); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221–22 (1875). The Court presumably would not have done so if the jus tertii inseverability argument could have been
rejected on the basis of a categorical rule that the litigant could not assert rights belonging
to another in the first instance.
93
See, e.g., Butts v. Merchs. & Miners Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 126, 132–38 (1913); Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. at 494, 499–502; Ill. Cent. R.R., 203 U.S. 514; James, 190
U.S. 127; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 98–99; Reese, 92 U.S. at 221–22.
94
243 U.S. 188 (1917).
95
Id. at 197.
96
To be sure, the Court often did not explicitly engage in reasoning of this sort, though
it occasionally did so. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Court’s
decision to “enforce[ ] the valid application against the” litigant making the jus tertii inseverability argument while “refrain[ing] from adjudicating the constitutionality of applications other than those at bar. . . . rests necessarily (if implicitly) on a judgment that the
statute is severable.” Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1951 (1997).
But see Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1082–83
(arguing that the Court’s rejection of claims premised on invalid applications of statutes to
third parties did not turn on issues of severability).
97
The Court deviated from that presumption briefly during the late Lochner era. See
Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 227 (2004).
98
There may be an outer limit to the presumption. The Court appears not to have definitively settled on the proper standard for assessing facial challenges—including jus tertii inseverability challenges—outside of the First Amendment “overbreadth” context. See infra notes
122–38 and accompanying text. In his opinion for the Court in United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987), Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that a litigant must show “that no set of
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of an indication of legislative intent to the contrary.99 As a practical matter, this presumption of severability greatly limits the utility of jus tertii inseverability arguments.
Because courts presume that a statute’s valid aspects are severable from its invalid
aspects, a litigant generally will not succeed in arguing that a statute cannot be applied to him because its application to third parties would be invalid. Indeed, the presumption of severability would permit a court to reach a conclusion of severability
quickly—sometimes, as in Clark, without stopping for discussion of the issue—and
thereby throw the litigant back upon assertion of his own rights.
3. The Lochner Era and Faux Jus Tertii Standing
Up until the late 1930s, the Court rarely addressed what we would today call
“jus tertii standing” arguments—that is, a litigant’s claim that she is entitled to relief
because a government action that would injure her impairs the rights of others. When
faced with those arguments, however, the Court rejected them on the ground that
a litigant could not challenge government action by asserting that it violated someone
else’s rights.100 If the Court viewed that rule as a discretionary, judge-made doctrine, it
never said so.
circumstances exists under which [a challenged] Act would be valid” to succeed in a facial
challenge. Id. at 745. Salerno rests on an extraordinarily strong presumption of severability.
Justice Stevens insisted that a litigant could succeed in a facial challenge by showing that the
challenged statute “lack[ed] any ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 n.7 (1997)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgments)). That standard would set a lower default threshold for
a conclusion of inseverability. Given Justice Stevens’s departure from the Court, the Salerno
approach may now stand unchallenged. It suffices for purposes of this Article to note that the
presumption of severability is robust under either approach.
99
See Vermeule, supra note 96, at 1950. Often, a statute will contain a severability
clause, which amounts to an explicit call for a presumption of severability. However, even
[w]hen the statute at issue contains no express severability clause, such
a presumption is implicit in the Court’s frequently repeated formula for
determining severability: “Unless it is evident that the Legislature would
not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is
left is fully operative as a law.”
Id. at 1950 n.28 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992), in turn
quoting the formula articulated in Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S.
210, 234 (1932)).
100
See Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 167 (1928); Rosenthal v. New York,
226 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1912); Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108, 114 (1904); Davis & Farnum
Mfg. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 220 (1903); Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S.
304, 309 (1898). Occasionally, the Court rejected a jus tertii standing argument on the ground
that the third parties’ rights were not violated, while making clear that the litigant could not, in
any event, succeed in asserting third-party rights. See Merchs. Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. v. Smart,
267 U.S. 126, 130–31 (1925); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 214 (1917); Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366 (1898). These cases suggest that the limitation on asserting third-party rights was
not perceived as a jurisdictional matter, but they do not sanction the doctrine of jus tertii standing.
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When read in modern light, a few of the Court’s Lochner-era cases might seem
to sanction jus tertii standing. These cases would play a role in the development of
jus tertii standing doctrine in later years. At the time, however, they were not understood to involve jus tertii standing.101 In these cases, litigants challenged laws that
they claimed violated their “paramount” substantive due process rights to property
and economic and contractual autonomy.102 A litigant’s assertion of his own fundamental rights did not end the analysis, however, as the State could abridge those
rights through a valid exercise of its police powers.103 Thus, the Court considered
third-party rights in these cases only in the course of determining whether the statute was invalid because it limited the litigant’s economic rights in a manner that was
“arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State to effect.”104
Buchanan v. Warley105 provides a good example. That case involved a specific
performance action by a white property vendor against an African American
vendee.106 The vendee argued, and the state courts held, that the contract could not
be enforced because a Louisville city ordinance prohibited minorities from moving
onto blocks occupied predominately by whites.107 The Supreme Court held that the
vendor could challenge application of the ordinance because it “necessarily impaired”
his “right . . . to sell his property.”108 The Court went on to hold that the ordinance
unlawfully interfered with the vendor’s own property rights in violation of the Due
Process Clause because the manner in which it limited his ability to dispose of his
property contravened the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1870 in its discrimination against minorities.109
Pierce v. Society of Sisters110 is similar. In Pierce, a pair of private schools challenged a law that required parents to send their children to public school and, thus,
indirectly harmed the private schools.111 The Court held that the private schools
could succeed in challenging the law on the ground that it unlawfully interfered with the
schools’ “business and property” rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by compelling “present and prospective patrons of their schools” to attend public schools
101

See Monaghan, supra note 8, at 287.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
103
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923).
104
See id.
105
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
106
Id. at 69–70.
107
Id. at 70.
108
Id. at 72–73; see also Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215 (1923) (citing Buchanan,
245 U.S. at 74, for the proposition that “property rights in the land include the right to use, lease
and dispose of it for lawful purposes”).
109
See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 75–82.
110
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
111
Id. at 530.
102
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instead.112 The Court, in other words, held that the private schools’ own substantive
due process rights were violated by the indirect harm caused by the challenged
law’s invasion of rights belonging to parents and pupils.
Thus, the Court in Buchanan and Pierce considered the effect of challenged
statutes on third parties in the course of adjudicating the litigants’ rights.113 The
Court did not purport to articulate anything like the modern exceptions to the bar
on third-party standing.
4. The Modern, Prudential Doctrine of Third-Party Standing
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Court began treating the bar on
“invoking the rights of others” as a “rule of self-restraint” developed by the Court
“for its own governance” and the governance of the federal courts.114 The Court
justified the now-prudential rule on policy grounds.115 Some of those policies invoked the interests of the nonlitigant right-holder. For instance, members of the
Court expressed a fear that the third party would be bound by unfavorable precedent
if the litigant failed in its assertion of her rights.116 More often, the prudential bar
on third-party standing was justified on institutional grounds. One justification focused
on the value of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudications, which supported
the idea that a court should not pass on the constitutional rights of nonlitigants
because they “may . . . not wish to assert [their rights], or [may] be able to enjoy them
regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful.”117 Another justification
reflected concern for quality advocacy, the reasoning being that “third parties . . . usually
will be the best proponents of their own rights.”118 The Court also referred to the desirability of not speculating on “every conceivable situation which might possibly
arise in the application of complex and comprehensive legislation.”119
Of course, a prudential rule is susceptible to exceptions based on countervailing
policies. The bar on third-party standing is no different. For instance, the Court has
characterized the jus tertii inseverability doctrine as an exception to the background
rule barring third-party standing.120 Moreover, beginning in the 1940s, the Court began
112
Id. at 535. Among other cases, the Court cited Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921),
which held that “business is a property right” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 327–28.
113
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 72–73.
114
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (Brandeis, J., concurring)); see also New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (collecting cases applying this “traditional rule”).
115
For criticism of the Court’s policy rationales, see Rohr, supra note 16, at 405–06.
116
See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976) (plurality opinion).
117
Id. at 113–14.
118
Id. at 114.
119
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1960) (quoting Barrows, 346 U.S. at 256).
120
See, e.g., id. at 22.
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crafting additional exceptions to the prohibitory default rule.121 This Article will focus
on the two most important exceptions: the doctrine of overbreadth and the doctrine
of jus tertii standing.
The overbreadth doctrine is an exception122 that applies in some First Amendment contexts.123 When the overbreadth doctrine applies, a court can wholly block
enforcement of a statute if the statute has a substantial number of unconstitutional
applications “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” even though
application of the law to the litigant before the court would be “consistent with the
Constitution.”124 In other words, courts in overbreadth cases “disregard the normal
rule” prohibiting third-party standing so that a litigant may assert the free speech
rights of third parties.125 As articulated by the Court, the doctrine is a judicially devised prophylactic rule, in that it rests not on a determination of the intended scope
of First Amendment rights, but instead on “a judicial prediction or assumption that
the [challenged] statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.”126
As others have perceptively observed, one can conceptualize the overbreadth
doctrine as involving a special rule of inseverability applicable in some free speech
contexts.127 In other words, in cases triggering the overbreadth doctrine, the Court
121

See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).
123
In the past, overbreadth challenges occasionally were entertained outside the First
Amendment context, including in cases involving abortion rights and the right to travel. See
Dorf, supra note 16, at 272; Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 859
n.29; see also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004) (collecting cases). This
Article focuses on the First Amendment context with which overbreadth challenges are most
commonly associated.
124
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (citation omitted).
125
See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980);
see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768–69. Like other constitutional rights, the right to free speech
is “personal.” See, e.g., L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39
(1999); Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988); Ferber, 458 U.S.
at 767–69; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 59–60 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610–12 (1973); see also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364–65
(1937) (explaining that the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause includes the “personal right of free speech”).
126
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612. The phenomenon described in the text is often referred to
as the “chilling effect.” Others have questioned whether—or how effectively—the overbreadth doctrine serves to alleviate this chilling effect. See, e.g., Fallon, Making Sense of
Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 885–87; Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1074–75.
127
See Dorf, supra note 16, at 262; Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and ThirdParty Standing, supra note 16, at 1346–47; Vermeule, supra note 96, at 1966–67. In an
overbreadth challenge in federal court, the rule of inseverability will give way only if the
statute is “‘readily subject’ to [a] narrowing construction” that eliminates its invalid applications. Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997) (citing Erznoznik v.
122

298

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:277

implicitly has replaced the presumption of severability with a rule of inseverability,
under which the intent of the legislature as to severability is beside the point.128 As
a result, a litigant can prevail by showing that the challenged statute would violate
the free speech rights of third parties if applied to them even absent a conclusion
that the legislature that created the challenged statute intended that result. The First
Amendment itself, however, does not impose a rule of inseverability.129 Any contention to the contrary would be in serious tension with the Court’s repeated recognition
that the right to free speech is personal.130 It also would be inconsistent with the
Court’s recognition that a state court may affirm a conviction obtained under an
overbroad statute after narrowing (and, in effect, severing) the statute to eliminate
the overbreadth.131 Thus, the overbreadth doctrine’s inseverability implications seem to
be only a necessary result of the Court’s policy-driven relaxation of the third-party
standing bar in some First Amendment contexts. That is, when the Court allows a
litigant to succeed in challenging a law on the ground that it would violate the free
speech rights of third parties if applied to them, it necessarily renders the challenged
statute inseverable. The upshot is that no rule of inseverability requires the overbreadth
doctrine; rather, application of the overbreadth doctrine results in inseverability.
Since the Court first applied the overbreadth doctrine in 1940,132 it has refined
the doctrine in ways that illustrate its judge-made, prudential nature. Specifically,
the Court has held the overbreadth doctrine inapplicable where circumstances leave
the Court unconcerned about the possible chilling of third-party speech.133 Thus, the
Court has declined to apply overbreadth doctrine where something about the thirdparty speech or speaker makes the Court less concerned about the “chilling” of
speech.134 For example, the Court has held that the overbreadth doctrine does not
apply to third-party commercial speech because “commercial speech is more hardy,
less likely to be ‘chilled,’ and not in need of surrogate litigators.”135 The Court also
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 397. A state
court faced with an overbreadth challenge to a state law enjoys greater freedom to construe
the statute to avoid overbreadth. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119–22 (1990).
128
See Note, Inseparability in Application of Statutes Impairing Civil Liberties, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 1208 (1948).
129
See Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 15–22 (explaining that the overbreadth
doctrine cannot be understood as a special rule of inseverability applicable in the free speech
context).
130
See supra note 125.
131
See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 115–16.
132
See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105–06 (1940).
133
See Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 191 n.5 (2007); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989).
134
See Davenport, 551 U.S. at 191 n.5; Fox, 492 U.S. at 481.
135
Fox, 492 U.S. at 481; see also Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 972 n.6 (1982) (rejecting overbreadth argument with an unexplained observation that “[t]he First Amendment
will not suffer if the constitutionality of [the challenged law] is litigated on a case-by-case
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has suggested that the overbreadth doctrine might be similarly inapplicable where
the third parties affected by the statute are private-sector unions, which “are sufficiently
capable of defending their own interests in court that they will not be significantly
‘chilled.’”136 And the Court has held that a state court may narrowly construe a statute to eliminate its overbreadth and then apply that statute to the litigant making the
overbreadth challenge.137 Once the statute has been narrowed, the reasoning goes,
“there is no longer any danger that protected speech will be deterred and therefore no
longer any reason to entertain the defendant’s [overbreadth] challenge.”138 These
exceptions confirm that the overbreadth doctrine is a matter of judicial discretion.
The second major exception to the third-party standing bar is the jus tertii
standing doctrine. That doctrine allows a litigant in some circumstances to succeed
in challenging government action on the ground that it infringes the rights of a third
party.139 The Court first applied a jus tertii standing theory in its 1953 decision in
Barrows v. Jackson.140 In Barrows, the Court allowed a white landowner to assert
the equal protection rights of minority “would-be users of restricted land” to defeat
her neighbors’ lawsuit, which sought to recover damages for the landowner’s breach
of a restrictive covenant.141 The Court held that the case before it presented a “unique
situation,” which called for the “relaxation” of the “rule of practice” under which
a litigant “cannot challenge [the] constitutionality [of government action] unless he
can show that he is within the class whose constitutional rights are allegedly infringed.”142 The Court thought the case unique in several ways. First, the litigant
landowner necessarily controlled whether minority would-be users of the property
could as a practical matter enjoy their constitutional right to be free of the discrimination engendered by judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.143
Second, the minority property users whose rights were at stake would find it “difficult if not impossible . . . to present their grievance[s] before any court.”144 Third,
the Court relied on the importance of the constitutional rights at stake.145
Following Barrows, the Court struggled to clearly define the basic purpose of
the jus tertii standing exception. The Court at times described this exception as
basis”); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758–60 (1974) (applying a weakened version of the
overbreadth doctrine in a challenge to military regulations).
136
See Davenport, 551 U.S. at 191 n.5.
137
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 115–16 (1990).
138
Id. at 115 n.12.
139
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192–95 (1976).
140
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
141
Id. at 251–52, 259–60.
142
Id. at 256–58. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recharacterized Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), as a jus tertii standing case and included a string cite of Supreme
Court cases, none of which endorsed the doctrine of jus terii standing. See Barrows, 346 U.S.
at 257–58.
143
See Barrows, 346 U.S. at 258.
144
Id. at 257, 259.
145
Id. at 258–59.
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serving what might be called an “advocate-enabling” function, in that it freely allows
litigants to advocate third-party rights.146 Despite that occasional rhetoric, the Court’s
early cases were narrower. Those cases applied the exception to serve a “fail-safe”
function, in that it allowed jus tertii standing “where, as a result of the very litigation in question, the constitutional rights of one not a party would be impaired, and
where he has no effective way to preserve them himself . . . .”147 Notably, these
cases also allowed litigants to assert the rights of others defensively.148 For instance,
the landowner in Barrows asserted the rights of minorities in an effort to avoid damages
liability, the threat of which would make it either impossible or more expensive for
minorities to exercise their right to rent or use property free of discrimination.149
And in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,150 the Court held that the NAACP
could resist an adjudication of contempt for failure to comply with a court order
requiring it to reveal its membership lists by asserting the right of its members not
to reveal their association.151 Had the NAACP complied with the order, the asserted
right would have been lost.152 In these cases and others like them, the jus tertii
standing doctrine operated to serve both a fail-safe function and an additional, “antievasion” function—in that it prevented government actors from interfering with
third parties’ rights through the expedient of regulating others. Had the Court limited jus tertii standing to such cases, the exception would have remained narrow.
In time, however, the Court allowed wider use of jus tertii standing. In Singleton v.
Wulff,153 Justice Blackmun articulated the rubric ultimately adopted by the Court.154
Under that test, a litigant may assert the rights of a third party if: (1) the litigant has
a close relationship with the third party, which touches upon the asserted third-party
right; and (2) there “is some genuine obstacle” to the third party’s assertion of her own
rights.155 On its face, that approach—and especially its insistence on a “genuine
obstacle”—appears to follow a moderate fail-safe view of the jus tertii standing
146

See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972) (“[T]he relationship between [the
litigant] and those whose rights he seeks to assert is . . . that between an advocate of the rights
of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so.”).
147
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960).
148
See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443–46; Barrows, 346 U.S. at 254, 258.
149
See Barrows, 346 U.S. 249.
150
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
151
See id. at 458–60.
152
Id. at 459. Several of the cases in which the Court has permitted jus tertii standing have
involved the defensive assertion of third-party rights. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett,
494 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1990); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976); Maness v.
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 468–70 (1975); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443–46; Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 488–90 (1969).
153
428 U.S. 106 (1976) (plurality opinion).
154
See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004) (applying the Singleton test).
155
Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–18.
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doctrine. The Court, however, has been “quite forgiving” in applying the test, and, as a
result, litigants have been permitted to assert third-party rights on a regular basis.156
The paradigmatic circumstance satisfying the “relationship” prong is the doctorpatient relationship.157 The Court also has held that the attorney-client relationship
is sufficiently close to allow an attorney to assert his clients’ rights.158 The same is true
of the relationship between a litigant159 and third parties discriminatorily excluded from
service on a jury or grand jury because “[t]hey share a common interest in eliminating
discrimination, and the [litigant] has an incentive to serve as an effective advocate.”160
The Court also has held that a vendor may assert the rights of her vendees161 or
potential vendees.162 And the Court occasionally has gone further, suggesting that
an “advocate” relationship between the litigant and the third party would suffice.163
The Court also has taken a relaxed approach to the “genuine obstacle” prong of
the Singleton test, refusing to insist that it be “in all practicable terms impossible”
for the third party to assert her rights.164 Thus, for instance, the Court has stated that
jus tertii standing is justified where there is a possibility that the third party would
be “chilled” from asserting her rights by “the publicity of a court suit,” even though
it is possible to litigate using a pseudonym.165 And in Miller v. Albright,166 seven
members of a fractured Court agreed that a sufficient “hindrance” existed where the
first-party right holder failed to take an appeal after being dismissed from the suit
on motion of the opposing party.167 The Court has even held that a sufficient “hindrance” exists when the third party would have little financial incentive to assert her
156

See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between
Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV.
633, 673 (2006); Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii, supra note 16, at 1312,
1319 n.36.
157
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
158
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1990); Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989).
159
See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 398–400 (1998) (criminal defendant);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55–56 (1992) (State in criminal proceeding); Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629–31 (1991) (civil litigant); Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 413–14 (1991) (criminal defendant).
160
Campbell, 523 U.S. at 398–400 (citation omitted).
161
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192–97 (1976).
162
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 683 (1977).
163
See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1972)).
164
See id. at 126 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165
See Carey, 431 U.S. at 684 n.4 (citation omitted); Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117 (plurality
opinion).
166
523 U.S. 420 (1998).
167
See id. at 433 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 454 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 473–74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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right in court because of “the economic burdens of litigation and the small financial
reward available.”168 Moreover, the Court on occasion has permitted a litigant to
assert the rights of a third party without stopping to consider whether that third party
faced any “genuine obstacle” at all.169
B. The Third-Party Standing Bar as Substantive Law
As discussed in Subpart A, the Court’s understanding of the bar on asserting
third-party rights has evolved over time. In Owings and its progeny, the Court
treated the rule as a matter of constitutional jurisdiction.170 And the Court treated
the rule as a merits question during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.171 Now, however, the Court has deemed the bar to be a matter of judicial
prudence.172 Thus, although history offers clues as to how courts might understand
and apply third-party standing doctrine,173 it provides no definitive answers. In light
of that fact and Lexmark’s questioning of the status quo, fresh analysis is appropriate. This Subpart undertakes that analysis. Specifically, it considers each of the three
ways in which the rule barring assertion of third-party rights might be understood:
as going to judicial prudence, constitutional jurisdiction, or the merits of the parties’
dispute. It argues that the rule barring assertion of third party rights is best understood as a merits rule, in that it concerns the substantive validity of the litigant’s
claim or defense.
1. The Rule Barring Assertion of Third-Party Rights Is Not a Prudential Doctrine
Should courts continue to treat the rule against the assertion of third-party rights as
a prudential standing doctrine? Prudential standing doctrines share one defining characteristic: they derive not from an extrajudicial source, but instead are judicially created
rules174 designed to allow courts to duck issues in cases falling within their jurisdiction so that those issues can be decided either by “other governmental institutions”
or, possibly, in another case.175 Because prudential standing rules are self-imposed
168

See, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 398–400 (1998).
See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989); see
also U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1990); Sec’y of State v. Joseph
H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954–58 (1984); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal.
& Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 841 n.44 (1977).
170
See supra notes 53–68 and accompanying text.
171
See supra notes 75–100 and accompanying text.
172
See supra notes 114–69 and accompanying text.
173
See infra notes 200–23, 227–32, 345–70 and accompanying text.
174
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
175
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975).
169
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rules of practice, courts can ignore them when they think it prudent to do so.176 Given
that flexibility, deeming the third-party standing bar a prudential rule likely would
ensure the continued existence of the overbreadth and jus tertii standing exceptions,
which the Court views as serving salutary goals.
Nevertheless, to understand the rule barring assertion of third-party rights as a
prudential doctrine requires acceptance of one of two conclusions, both of which
are in deep tension with an oft-lauded policy behind the law of justiciability—ensuring that the federal courts serve, but do not exceed, their proper role in our constitutional scheme.
First, the prudential understanding could rest on an assumption that there are
no extrajudicial limits on who enjoys the protection of a given legal right. On that
assumption, any such limits are imposed by the courts themselves to further the
courts’ view of sound judicial administration.177 But the premise of that argument
is wrong: it is a “cardinal principle” that legal rights come prepackaged by their creators
with limitations on who can assert them, and when.178 Even putting that fact aside,
serious constitutional concerns would be raised if federal courts deprived litigants
of the ability to enforce legal rights that substantive lawmakers have authorized them to
invoke. In doing so, courts would allow their own preference (to impose a limit on
who can assert the right) to override the design of the body that created the right
(without imposing such a limit). If that is how the bar on asserting “third-party”
rights operates, it seems inconsistent with our constitutional structure.179
An example helps to make the point. Assume that the Second Amendment imposes no limits on who may assert the rights it creates and that a plaintiff comes into
federal court claiming that her local sheriff violated the Second Amendment by taking away guns belonging to members of her neighborhood watch. And suppose the
plaintiff alleges that she was injured by an assailant who attacked her while she was
having a conversation with the leader of the (now-gunless) neighborhood watch.
What if the court dismisses the case on the ground that the plaintiff cannot invoke
the Second Amendment because she did not own the guns in question? If all jurisdictional requirements have been met, the court’s decision would amount to a refusal
176

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (citing Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank
v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980)); see also id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Relegating
a jurisdictional requirement to ‘prudential’ status is a wondrous device, enabling courts to
ignore the requirement whenever they believe it ‘prudent’—which is to say, a good idea.”).
177
On this view, the rule barring assertion of third-party rights might be seen as an exercise
of the “passive virtues” to avoid difficult or divisive issues, for example, Alexander M.
Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV.
40, 40–51 (1961), or to put off deciding a case where a “mo[re] interested plaintiff” exists,
for example, Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191 (2014).
178
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982); see Warth, 422 U.S. at 509 (plaintiffs
lacked “prudential standing” where they did not assert “personal rights” under statute).
179
See Brown, supra note 19, at 100–01.
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by the court to adjudicate rights assertable by the plaintiff. The court will have turned
the litigant out of court based on its sense of prudence.
The court, in making that decision, would fail to fulfill the role assigned it by
the Constitution—exercise of the “judicial power.”180 As the Supreme Court has
long recognized, that constitutionally assigned role carries with it an obligation of
the federal courts to decide those cases over which they have jurisdiction.181 And,
as the Court recently acknowledged in Lexmark, “prudential” justiciability doctrines
are “in . . . tension” with that constitutional obligation to the extent they allow
courts to refuse to adjudicate cases falling within the jurisdiction lawfully conferred
by Congress.182 In Lexmark, the Court resolved that tension in favor of the courts’
constitutional obligation when it abandoned the concept of “prudential” statutory
standing.183 The same result seems appropriate with respect to the third-party standing bar, to the extent that it is viewed as a judicial refusal to allow litigants to assert
rights that substantive lawmakers have authorized them to assert.
To be clear, more is at stake here than judicial administration. The federal courts’
refusal to exercise lawfully conferred jurisdiction harms individuals who are deprived
of a forum in which to settle their disputes and to vindicate their rights.184 Moreover, it aggrandizes the courts’ power at the expense of the bodies that generally
180

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“The judiciary cannot, as
the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. . . .
With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide
it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”). More recently, the Court has described the federal courts’ obligation to exercise jurisdiction as “virtually unflagging.” Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (emphasis added).
As that more relaxed formulation reflects, the Court over time has developed some “exceptions” to the federal courts’ obligation to adjudicate cases over which Congress has given
them jurisdiction. Id. at 813–19. I plan to explore those exceptions in a future project, but I
make two observations here. First, any “exceptions” are justifiable only if consistent with the
obligation of the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction lawfully conferred by Congress. Because that obligation results from fundamental principles of separation of powers and constitutional structure, it must prevail over an inconsistent “exception.” See New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989). Second, some of the seeming
“exceptions” might actually be consistent with the obligation to exercise jurisdiction. For
instance—and this is a tentative view—the Supreme Court may be correct in asserting that
some abstention decisions involve only a court’s exercise of common-law-derived and congressionally approved “discretion” to withhold equitable relief in deference to related state
proceedings. Id. No similar reasoning supports the third-party standing bar, conceptualized as
a judicial refusal to allow litigants to assert rights that substantive lawmakers have authorized
them to assert based on a judicial perception that there exist “better” proponents of the right.
182
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014);
see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014).
183
See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386–87.
184
See Brown, supra note 19, at 100–01.
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possess law-making power under our constitutional arrangement. For instance, by
refusing to exercise jurisdiction lawfully granted to them by Congress, courts undermine Congress’s power to define the jurisdiction of the federal courts. And by
erecting otherwise non-existent standing barriers to the assertion of legal rights,
courts effectively destroy, diminish, or (at a minimum) alter those rights.185 In the
process, courts diminish the constitutional power of lawmakers to make effective
law. The Court acknowledged as much in Lexmark, observing that courts inappropriately intrude on the law-making domain when they impose prudence-based limits
on who may assert legal rights.186 In at least these respects, a court’s refusal to adjudicate a right based on judicially imposed limits on who may assert it would contravene
the structural framework of our Constitution.
Second, and more realistically, the prudential understanding of the bar on
asserting third-party rights might be based on: (1) a recognition that legal rights are
limited, personal, and private, in that they belong to a pre-set class of right-holders,
as individuals;187 and (2) an accompanying willingness to permit judges to disregard
those limits when they see fit. But if that is the case, the background rule lacks the
hallmark of a prudential rule, in that it derives not from the judiciary, but rather
from the design of lawmakers who create limited, personal rights.
Of course, it could be argued that the exercise of judicial prudence comes by
way of the exceptions to the rule barring assertion of third-party rights. And that is
true: the exceptions to the third-party standing bar are judge-made. But, if the “prudential” label rests on the judge-made exceptions to the third-party standing bar, the
question arises whether courts legitimately may ignore, based on their perception
of sound judicial administration, limits established by the lawmakers who created
an asserted right.
Separation-of-powers and federalism principles would seem to require a negative answer. The Court repeatedly has insisted that justiciability doctrines exist to
“prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches.”188 To allow courts, under the guise of “prudential” standing, to disregard
congressionally imposed limitations on the scope of congressionally created rights
would appear to contravene that purpose. As the Court stated in Lexmark, “a court
cannot apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that
185

See id. at 124.
See 134 S. Ct. at 1388.
187
A “private right” is “[a] personal right, as opposed to a right of the public or the state.”
Private Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The point here is that legal
provisions often sweep broadly in the sense that they provide rights to a large class of people,
while at the same time protecting each member of that class only as an individual. For instance, the Fourth Amendment protects “the people,” U.S. CONST. amend. IV, but only in the
sense that it provides each person with an individual right, Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct.
2012, 2022 (2014).
188
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).
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Congress has denied.”189 And, outside of the horizontally oriented context of federal
separation of powers, it would run contrary to the purpose of justiciability doctrine
to allow courts to ignore limitations placed on state created rights by state lawmakers
or on constitutionally created rights by the relevant Framers. In all three scenarios—
whether involving constitutional rights, federal statutory rights, or state-law rights—
the court would be exercising an essentially legislative power by expanding the scope
of legal rights in a manner divorced from the design of the lawmakers who created
those rights, despite the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence that our Constitution
allocates no such authority to the federal courts.190 In so doing, the court would be
depriving the body that created the right of its authority to define and limit the right
that it created. Justiciability doctrines exist to prevent such judicial interference with
the authority of other constitutional actors, not to facilitate them. In sum, if thirdparty standing doctrine is founded on judicial prudence, it appears to be a prudence
that is at odds with the constitutionally assigned role of federal courts.
2. The Rule Barring Assertion of Third-Party Rights Is Not a Matter of
Constitutional Jurisdiction
The constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction create no blanket rule
barring assertion of third-party rights. Article III establishes inflexible outer limits
on the federal courts’ power.191 As relevant here, Article III imposes two requirements on a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction: (1) a “case” or “controversy” must
be present so as to establish Article III standing; and (2) the “case” or “controversy”
must fall into one of the jurisdictional categories listed in Article III, section 2.192
First, Article III’s “case” or “controversy” limitation says nothing about whether a
proper litigant can assert legal rights belonging to someone else. If a litigant shows
the requisite injury-in-fact and also makes the required showings of causation and
redressability, he has satisfied Article III’s “case” or “controversy” requirement. For
that litigant, the Article III standing requirement limits neither the arguments he can
make nor the rights he can invoke. Indeed, the Court’s current third-party standing
case law assumes as much, as it sometimes permits litigants with Article III standing
to assert rights belonging to others.193
189

134 S. Ct. at 1388.
See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006); Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981).
191
See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161 (1990).
192
Putting aside the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Article III also requires that
Congress have granted the court jurisdiction over the type of “case” or “controversy” at issue.
See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (jurisdiction of inferior courts); Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512–14 (1868) (appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court). Thus, Congress presumably could limit the ability of federal courts to adjudicate suits
premised on third-party rights. It has not done so, and this topic therefore is not pursued
further here.
193
See Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a
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However, the “case” or “controversy” requirement is relevant to the third-party
standing issue in one respect: a litigant who has no injury-in-fact of her own cannot
assert a third party’s injury to establish Article III standing.194 The Court’s recent
decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry195 is instructive. In that case, proponents of
California’s Proposition 8—but not state officials—sought to appeal a district court
order holding Proposition 8 unconstitutional.196 The Court recognized that the district
court’s order had caused the State injury-in-fact by striking down a state law, and that
the State had authorized the proponents to assert that injury.197 The Court nevertheless
held that the proponents could not rely on the State’s injury to satisfy Article III because Article III requires the litigant to assert “a personal, particularized injury.”198
The upshot is that a litigant without a cognizable injury cannot satisfy the constitutional standing requirements by pointing to another’s injury. But that just restates
the basic rule that a litigant must show that he has suffered an injury-in-fact to invoke federal court jurisdiction.199 It does not support a general ban on the assertion
of third-party legal rights even by a litigant who has himself suffered a remediable
injury caused by the other party.
Second, Article III’s limitation of federal court jurisdiction to certain types of
“cases” and “controversies” does not require a blanket rule barring litigants from asserting third-party rights. Broadly speaking, Article III gives “[j]urisdiction . . . to the
[federal courts] in two classes of cases,” with each class containing multiple types
of cases.200 To come within the federal courts’ Article III jurisdiction, a case need
only fall into one of the enumerated categories.
In one “class” of cases listed in Article III, “[federal court] jurisdiction depends
entirely on the character of the parties” to the litigation.201 This class of Article III cases
includes controversies: “to which the United States shall be a party”; “between two
or more States”; “between Citizens of different States”; and “between a State, or the
Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1169, 1172 (2008).
194
The Supreme Court, relying on long-standing historical practice, has recognized limited
exceptions to this rule. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 271,
273–85 (2008) (assignee); Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 771–78 (2000) (qui tam plaintiff); Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 162–64 (“next friend”); see
also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 397 (1821) (“Foreign consuls frequently
assert, in our Prize Courts, the claims of their fellow subjects.”).
195
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
196
See id. at 2668.
197
See id. at 2665, 2668.
198
Id. at 2652, 2667.
199
This may be what Professor Brown had in mind when he wrote that, “[l]ooking to the
case and controversy question, the third-party rights inquiry is clearly not independent,” but
rather “is a reformulation of Article III standing principles.” Brown, supra note 19, at 131.
200
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821).
201
Id.
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Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”202 In cases falling into
this class, the “parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the Union,”
without regard to “the subject of [the] controversy.”203 Thus, in those cases, Article III
concerns itself neither with the arguments made by the litigants nor with the legal
rights asserted by them.
A caveat is warranted here. The Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts
should not countenance the use of third parties to effect “frauds upon [federal court]
jurisdiction.”204 Thus, for instance, the Court has held, at least as a matter of statutory
law, that diversity jurisdiction does not lie where a nondiverse, would-be plaintiff
arranges for a diverse entity to sue on its behalf, with the diverse plaintiff having
only a feigned interest in the matter.205 Similarly, the Court has held that listing a
state as a plaintiff will not give rise to federal court jurisdiction where the suit seeks
to remedy private injuries—that is, where the state has not suffered an injury to its
own “sovereign or quasi-sovereign” interests.206
Those rules impose a limit of sorts on the assertion of third-party rights. Specifically, they prohibit right-holders from using sham arrangements to assert their claims in
federal court via other parties, who are enumerated in Article III but who, in reality,
are uninjured by the defendants’ activities. In this respect, these rules prohibiting
“frauds upon [federal court] jurisdiction” resemble the limitation discussed above
in connection with constitutional standing doctrine207: they prevent a litigant without a
constitutionally cognizable injury from establishing jurisdiction on the basis of
202

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The second section of Article III also extended federal judicial
power to controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State.” Id. Due to the Eleventh
Amendment, a state can no longer be subjected against its will to federal jurisdiction in such
a suit, or in a suit by citizens or subjects of a foreign country. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Also, there is one “type” of controversy in which the existence of jurisdiction depends on
both the citizenship of the parties and the substance of the dispute. Specifically, the federal
judicial power extends to controversies “between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This rarely used Land Grants Clause
does appear to impose some limitation on the ability of a litigant to assert a third party’s rights,
in that it premises jurisdiction on the nondiverse litigant’s “claim” to the land. Of course, that
limitation serves only to make the Land Grants Clause unavailable as a source of federal
jurisdiction in certain circumstances; it does not support a general bar on the assertion of
third-party rights.
203
Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 378.
204
Miller & Lux, Inc. v. E. Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293, 297 (1908).
205
Compare id. at 296–97, 300–06 (1908) (no statutory diversity jurisdiction over suit
against a California defendant, where a California corporation gave its interest in property
to the nominal plaintiff, a Nevada shell corporation created for the purpose of litigation), with
Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528, 532–33 (1891) (diversity statute satisfied where debt was
transferred to a diverse bona fide purchaser in exchange for consideration, even though the
transfer was for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction).
206
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976); see also Kansas v. Colorado,
533 U.S. 1, 7 (2001).
207
See supra notes 194–99 and accompanying text.
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someone else’s injury or an infringement of someone else’s rights. They do not,
however, support a general ban on assertion of third-party rights in a case where a party
who is injured in fact litigates to remedy that injury.
In the second class of cases listed in Article III, the existence of Article III jurisdiction “depends on the character of the cause, whoever may be the parties.”208 This
class of cases includes all cases: “affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and
Consuls”; “of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”; and “arising under th[e] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their authority.”209
One of those clauses appears to envision the assertion of third-party rights in
some circumstances. Specifically, the Ambassadors Clause extends federal jurisdiction over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors” and other enumerated officials, rather
than merely over cases in which enumerated officials are parties.210 The First Congress so understood the Clause, as it by statute gave the Supreme Court exclusive
jurisdiction over “proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or
their domestics, or domestic servants.”211 The goal of the Ambassadors Clause was
to protect the interests of the listed foreign officials and, thereby, to protect our relations with foreign countries.212 Where an enumerated official is not a party to an
Ambassadors Clause suit drawing in question his rights or interests, that goal would
be accomplished only if the litigant—for instance, a domestic or domestic servant
named as a defendant—could assert the rights or interests of the foreign official.213
Thus, the Ambassadors Clause suggests that the Constitution affirmatively envisions
that litigants may assert third-party rights in some circumstances.
Neither of the remaining subject-matter-focused clauses of Article III appear to
place limits on the ability of litigants to assert rights belonging to others. Most obviously, the Admiralty Clause creates no such limits, as it focuses entirely on the
connection of the dispute to maritime matters.214
That leaves only the Arising Under Clause, which serves as the constitutional
basis for jurisdiction over most suits involving an assertion of third-party rights. A
208

Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 378.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
210
Id. (emphasis added).
211
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789) (emphasis added); see Osborn v. Bank
of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 855 (1824) (“[J]urisdiction does not depend on the party
named in the record.”).
212
See, e.g., United States v. Liddle, 26 F. Cas. 936, 937–38 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 15,
598).
213
See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 854–55 (“The minister does not, by the mere arrest
of his secretary, or his servant, become a party to th[e] suit, but the actual defendant pleads
to the jurisdiction of the Court, and asserts his privilege.”).
214
The existence of jurisdiction under the Admiralty Clause depends entirely on the connection of the suit to: (1) navigable waters, for example, The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 53 (12 How.) 443, 454–57 (1851); and (2) traditional maritime activities, for example, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby Eng’g, 543 U.S. 14, 24 (2004); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc.
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 532–33, 538–43 (1995).
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general rule prohibiting the assertion of third-party rights cannot be grounded in the
Arising Under Clause as currently interpreted by the Court. As already noted, recent
Supreme Court opinions interpret Article III as extending the federal judicial power
to, at a minimum, every case that necessarily involves a question of federal law.215
Where a litigant’s request for relief depends on a third party’s federal rights, the
case necessarily involves a question of federal law because the litigant, in order to
prevail, must show that the third party’s federal rights were, or would be, violated
by the challenged action.216 That explains why federal courts often adjudicate cases
in which litigants assert third-party federal rights to challenge state action.217
One question is whether the Court would, or should, return to the restrictive
reading of the Arising Under Clause articulated in Owings.218 As we saw earlier, the
Court in that case held that a case does not “arise under” federal law within the meaning of Article III when the litigant seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction relies on
the federal rights of third parties to do so.219 As a practical matter, a return to that
long-abandoned understanding of federal court authority is unlikely.220 Were it to
return to the Owings approach, the Court would not only foreclose lower federal
courts from exercising “arising under” jurisdiction to adjudicate claims premised
on third-party federal rights, but also would, contrary to long-standing precedent,221
foreclose itself from doing so in proceedings arising out of state court. And, as a
normative matter, it is difficult to understand why the Court should return to Owings’s
reading of Article III, which was not self-evidently correct. The language of the
Arising Under Clause is capacious enough to encompass suits premised on the federal
rights of third parties, and Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion offered little in the way
of historical (or other) support for its narrow reading of the Clause.222 Moreover,
that narrow reading created a risk that state courts would issue unreviewable and
conflicting decisions regarding the meaning of federal law, a risk that Article III was
designed to minimize.223 In light of these considerations, it seems safe to assume that the
215

See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
Cf. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (recognizing that resolution of a federal question was “necessary” to the case where one element of plaintiff’s claim required
resolution of a question of federal law).
217
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 55–68 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text.
220
See supra note 91 (noting the silent abandonment of the jurisdictional principle of
Owings).
221
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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See Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 347–48 (1809). In contrast,
Luther Martin—ironically, an Anti-Federalist—relied on the intent of the Framers and the
“cotemporaneous exposition given to the constitution by the first congress” in arguing for a
broad reading of the Arising Under Clause. Id. at 349–50.
223
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 385 (1821); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816); Bellia, supra note 54, at 293.
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Arising Under Clause will not be read as imposing a restriction on the assertion of
third-party rights.
In any event, to hold that a party may not invoke Article III “arising under” jurisdiction on the basis of someone else’s federal rights does not impose a categorical
bar on the assertion of third-party rights in federal court. A court could adjudicate
a litigant’s assertion of third-party rights in a diversity case.224 Or, a federal court
could exercise supplemental jurisdiction225 to adjudicate claims premised on thirdparty rights where the litigant has properly invoked “arising under” jurisdiction by
asserting claims premised on her own federal rights. For instance, a litigant might
claim that application of a law to her would violate both her rights and the rights of
third parties; those two claims would arise out of a “common nucleus of operative
fact”226—that is, application of the challenged law to the litigant. Thus, even under
Owings, Article III does not impose a blanket bar on the assertion of third-party
rights in federal court.
3. The Rule Barring Assertion of Third-Party Rights Concerns the Merits of the
Claim or Defense
The rule barring assertion of third-party rights goes to the merits of the parties’
dispute in that it concerns “the substantive” issue of whether a litigant can establish
the “grounds of a claim or defense.”227 To see why, consider what it means for a
court to reject a claim or defense on the ground that the litigant cannot assert another’s
rights. The court is holding that the asserted right has a limited scope, that the litigant falls outside of that scope, and that his claim or defense fails as a result.228 That
sort of reasoning has lain at the core of all of the Court’s decisions refusing to allow
a litigant to assert third-party rights. As examples: Owings necessarily involved a
determination of the scope of rights created by the asserted treaty;229 Clark necessarily involved a determination that equal protection rights are personal;230 and the
Court’s modern cases necessarily begin with an assessment of whether a litigant is
224

Doing so would be most obviously appropriate if state law authorized the litigant to
assert the third-party rights. See infra notes 302–08 and accompanying text (discussing the
possibility that state law would authorize assertion of third-party rights via jus tertii inseverability challenges); infra note 312 (same, with respect to jus tertii standing).
225
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012).
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United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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Merits, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
228
See Stern, supra note 193, at 1201; see also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 244 (in course of
arguing that all standing doctrine goes to the merits, stating: “In third party standing cases, . . . the
issue is a question of law on the merits: Does the plaintiff have the right to enforce the legal
duty in question?”); Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of Law,
14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595, 607–10 (1987) (similar).
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See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text.
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asserting rights that belong to her—that is, rights that extend to her without being
expanded by the judiciary.231 When a court applies the bar on third-party standing
to reject a litigant’s claim or defense, it necessarily resolves a merits question concerning the scope of the substantive right asserted by the litigant.232
It might be illuminating to consider the bar on asserting third-party rights alongside
the “zone of interests” test, which Lexmark reclassified as a “merits” doctrine.233 The
“zone of interests” test, remember, instructs courts to use “traditional tools of . . .
interpretation”234 to ascertain whether a litigant’s interests are “within the zone of
interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee” that he seeks to invoke.235 As the Court explained in Lexmark, the test is a
method for determining whether the litigant “falls within the class” to whom the
relevant lawmaker has extended the asserted right.236 The goal, in other words, is
to effectuate the right-creator’s design regarding the line between those who enjoy
the protection of the right and those who do not.237
The rule against asserting third-party rights works toward the same goal.238 Specifically, the rule prevents a litigant from end-running the line between protected
right-holders and unprotected non-right-holders through the simple expedient of
asserting rights belonging to a protected right-holder.239 Following the Court’s lead
in Lexmark, a court faced with a third-party standing issue will apply standard interpretive methodologies to determine whether a litigant belongs to the class to whom
the relevant lawmaker extended the asserted right.240 If the litigant falls outside the
231

See supra notes 114–69 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has already reached this conclusion in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
233
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387–88
(2014).
234
Id. at 1387.
235
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
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Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388.
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See id. at 1387–88.
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See TRIBE, supra note 16, at 446.
239
See id.
240
This question will sometimes be answered expressly by the text of the right-creating
provision. For instance, “[t]he Constitution protects the privileges and immunities only of
citizens, Amdt. 14, § 1; see Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and the right to vote only of citizens. Amdts. 15,
19, 24, 26.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 n.12 (1976). In other circumstances, the inquiry will not be so simple. As Professor Llewellyn famously showed, even well-accepted
canons of construction can be used to reach differing conclusions regarding the meaning of
a text. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399–406 (1949).
A court must also consider relevant judicial decisions when determining whether a
litigant falls within or without the right-holding class. The need to consider judicial decisions
is perhaps most obvious when constitutional provisions are at issue, given that such provisions often are generally framed and must be expounded by courts. See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). For example, the Supreme Court has long
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protected class, his claim fails on the merits under the rule barring assertion of thirdparty rights.241 In that respect, the rule barring assertion of third-party rights effectuates the design of the right-creating lawmaker.
The rule also effectuates the right-creator’s design when the litigant belongs to the
right-holding class. As noted above, most rights are personal in that lawmakers
granted them to right-holders as individuals.242 The rule against asserting third-party
rights enforces that limitation. For instance, assume that Congress passes a statute
providing that “all citizens shall enjoy a personal right of online privacy,” which includes “freedom from governmental examination of internet browsing activities in
the absence of a warrant issued upon probable cause.” Assume further that the statute
provides that “information obtained in violation of a citizen’s right under this statute
shall not be admissible against that citizen in legal proceedings in a court of law.”
If John is a citizen accused of a crime, he cannot assert the statute to exclude evidence
of Jane’s internet browsing activities, even if the government obtained that information without a warrant. Both John and Jane belong to the class protected by the statute,
but John’s argument fails on the merits because Congress created a personal right.243
recognized that the Constitution’s separation-of-powers, checks-and-balances, and federalism
principles protect, and thus may be asserted by, injured individuals, even though the constitutional provisions bearing on those principles do not explicitly indicate that they create
individual rights. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363–67 (2011); Kent Barnett,
Standing For (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (defending
this traditional view). Similarly, the Court has interpreted some constitutional provisions—
most notably, the Due Process Clauses—to protect rights that are not specifically identified
in the text. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (Due Process Clauses protect
“a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”). And, where state-law
rights are at issue, the court will of course need to consider state judicial decisions. See Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
The point here is not that it will be easy in every instance to determine the class of individuals to whom lawmakers extended a given right. Imprecise language, conflicting or ambiguous historical sources, differing views as to which sources are appropriately considered,
broader differences concerning appropriate methods of interpretation, and other complicating
factors all might lead to good faith disagreements concerning whether a litigant falls within
or without the right-holding class. But these difficulties are inherent in adjudication. They
do not call into question the legitimacy of judicial efforts to delineate the scope of substantive
rights any more than they call into question the legitimacy of judicial efforts to determine
their content.
241
Because arguments on the merits may be forfeited, a court generally should decline to
address the third-party standing issue if the party opposing assertion of a right failed to raise
the issue in a lower court. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008).
242
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
243
If a litigant seeks to assert a right that belongs in the first instance to someone else, a
court must also determine whether Congress or a state has authorized the litigant to assert the
right. In the most familiar scenario, lawmakers authorize corporate shareholders in some
circumstances to assert a corporation’s rights on behalf of the corporation. See, e.g., Gollust
v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991); Nedler v. Vaisberg, 427 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
Also, Congress has codified the “next friend” doctrine in the habeas corpus context, see 28
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In sum, issues of third-party “standing” present a merits question: whether a
litigant has a valid claim or defense under the asserted right. And the no-third-partystanding rule requires courts to defer to the design of the lawmakers who created the
asserted right in answering that question. That is the proper approach for resolving
merits issues. As the Court reaffirmed in Lexmark, federal courts must defer to the
design of the lawmakers who created the substantive law244—Congress, when a federal statute is at issue; a state, when state law is at issue; and the Framers, when a
constitutional provision is at issue. To override the lawmakers’ design would be to
violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers where a federal statute
is at issue; the constitutional principle of federalism where a state law is at issue;
and the will of the people where the Constitution itself is at issue.245 The rule barring assertion of third-party rights is just a specific application of these principles
to the merits question of whether a litigant is a proper claimant of the right she
asserts.246 Thus, recognition that the issue of “third-party standing” in fact goes to
the merits of the dispute in no way will disturb the general rule that a litigant cannot
succeed in asserting rights belonging to another. However, the same may not be true
of the exceptions to that rule. The following Parts therefore consider the continuing
vitality of the doctrines of overbreadth and jus tertii standing.
U.S.C. § 2242 (2012), thereby allowing a third party to pursue a habeas corpus action on behalf
of a prisoner in some circumstances, for example, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
161–66 (1990). In addition, states now widely permit the assignment of claims, and the resulting
assignees may assert in federal court the claims, and thus rights, that belonged in the first
instance to their assignors. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269,
275–85 (2008). Similarly, Congress, in the False Claims Act, has authorized private litigants
to assert the federal government’s rights. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000). And, under a long-standing tradition incorporated into statutory
law, certain litigants may pursue the surviving claims of a decedent. See Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 711–12 (1987). Under the current framework, these examples, to the extent that they
involve congressional action, might be considered illustrative of Congress’s ability to modify
the “prudential rules” against assertion of third-party rights. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 120 (1979) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (citation omitted). They are
more accurately described, however, as involving an assertion of first-party rights, as in each
example a relevant lawmaker—whether Congress or a state—has authorized the litigant to
assert a legal right that is either shared with the first-order right-holder or that originally belonged to the first-order right-holder. The Supreme Court has recognized as much when it
comes to assignees, explaining that an assignee asserts what are, by virtue of a valid assignment,
“legal rights of [her] own.” See Sprint Commc’ns, 554 U.S. at 290.
244
See 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286
(2001) (“[S]ubstantive federal law . . . must be created by Congress.” (citing Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979))); Erie R.R., 304 U.S. at 78 (federal courts
must defer to state common law).
245
See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution . . . .”).
246
See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text (explaining that these principles should
preclude courts from ignoring limits that lawmakers place on rights they create).
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III. THE CONTINUING VIABILITY OF OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
This Part assesses whether the overbreadth doctrine can survive if the Court
accepts that issues of third-party “standing” go to the merits. As currently articulated,
overbreadth doctrine is inconsistent with the idea that courts must defer to the decisions of nonjudicial lawmakers concerning the scope of legal rights. In the First
Amendment, the Framers created a personal right.247 If that decision is accorded
deference, a litigant’s attempt to assert someone else’s rights under the First Amendment would fail on the merits. Yet, the overbreadth doctrine allows litigants to succeed
in asserting the First Amendment rights of third parties.248 If the bar on third-party
standing goes to the merits, the overbreadth doctrine, as a judge-made, prudential
disregard of the limited scope of First Amendment rights, must fall.
That raises the question whether there is such a thing as a “first-party” overbreadth challenge. That is, are there grounds on which a court could accept something like an overbreadth argument, while at the same time respecting lawmakers’
decisions regarding the scope of legal rights? The following Subparts evaluate two
theories under which that question might be answered in the affirmative.
A. The “Valid-Rule” Approach to Overbreadth Doctrine
Advocating what I will call the “valid-rule approach,” some have suggested that
all overbreadth challenges are really first-party challenges. Although the details differ,
these arguments generally go as follows: under the substantive constitutional standards
applicable where free speech rights are at stake, a law must be narrowly tailored to
serve a sufficiently important government interest.249 When a litigant makes an overbreadth argument, she is arguing that the challenged statute is not a constitutionally
valid rule because it impacts protected speech and lacks the regulatory precision
required under substantive First Amendment law. The litigant is, in other words,
asserting her own “right to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule
of law.”250 Thus, this argument depends on the premise that every litigant has a firstparty right to be judged in accordance with a law that satisfies an applicable narrowtailoring requirement—that is, a law that could be applied validly to others.251 The
First Amendment could supply that right, in which case the overbreadth doctrine would
remain limited to the First Amendment context. Or, some other constitutional source
247

See supra note 125.
See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
249
See Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 3.
250
Id. at 3–4. For varying descriptions of this argument, see Dorf, supra note 16, at 262;
Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873,
887–89 (2005); Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 3–4, 37–38; Monaghan, supra
note 8, at 282–86; Roosevelt, supra note 16, at 1009–10.
251
See Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 8.
248
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could supply a freestanding right to be judged only in accordance with “a valid rule of
law,” in which case overbreadth doctrine would extend to every context involving rights
to which the Court has attached a narrow-tailoring requirement.252
The problem with the valid-rule approach is that no provision of the Constitution creates the requisite right to a valid rule—that is, a rule that would not violate
the rights of third parties if applied to them. The First Amendment itself creates no such
right. Rather, it creates a “personal right” shielding the individual from the application against him of laws that would curtail his speech without sufficient justification.253 Were it otherwise, the Court’s oft-repeated statements that the overbreadth
doctrine is an exception to the traditional rule that “one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that” its
application to others would be unconstitutional254 would make little sense.
252

Whether derived from the First Amendment or from an independent source, recognition
of the requisite right to a valid rule would extend overbreadth doctrine beyond the free speech
contexts in which it generally applies. See supra notes 122–23, 132–38 and accompanying
text; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“[W]e have not recognized
an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”). For instance,
even if derived from the First Amendment, a right to a valid rule would allow a litigant to make
overbreadth arguments where the challenged law would restrict third-party commercial
speech, see Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 248 (2010)
(explaining that restrictions on commercial speech must be “n[o] more extensive than is
necessary to serve” the government’s interest (alteration in original)), and where a conductregulating law allegedly restricts third-party expressive conduct, see United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[I]ncidental restriction[s] on alleged First Amendment freedoms”
must be “no greater than is essential to the furtherance of” government interest). And, under
the freestanding right to a valid rule advocated by proponents of the valid-rule approach, the
overbreadth doctrine would extend to every context involving rights to which the Court has
attached a narrow-tailoring requirement. See Dorf, supra note 16, at 262–77; Fallon, Making
Sense of Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 884 n.192; Metzger, supra note 250, at 888–89;
Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 4, 36–39; Roosevelt, supra note 16, at 1010. For
example, a litigant could make overbreadth arguments where a law allegedly infringes third
parties’ Second Amendment rights. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29,
628 n.27 (2008) (stating that the Second Amendment requires heightened scrutiny). Indeed,
under this articulation of the valid-rule approach, the overbreadth doctrine would apply whenever a law would infringe on third parties’ enumerated rights, see United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) (suggesting that heightened scrutiny applies whenever legislation transgresses “a specific prohibition of the Constitution”), or unenumerated
rights that are fundamental, see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (noting that the
government may not “infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all . . . unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”). Of course, that the
valid-rule approach would require an extension of overbreadth doctrine does not prove that
there is no (as yet unrecognized) right to be judged by a valid rule. But it does suggest that
advocates of the valid-rule approach have a tough row to hoe in showing that such an alteration is required.
253
See supra note 125.
254
See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). In Board of Trustees. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469 (1989), the Supreme Court described the overbreadth doctrine as a “necessary
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Nor can the right-to-a-valid-rule be derived from the First Amendment’s narrowtailoring requirements. Those requirements, as aspects of the substantive standards
for judging the validity of applications of law in the First Amendment context, serve
to protect, and are tied to, personal constitutional rights. For instance, the First
Amendment generally protects a right not to have one’s speech regulated on the
basis of its content, but the government may regulate speech based on its content
if it can show that doing so is necessary to serve a compelling government interest.255
The narrow-tailoring requirement applicable to content-based speech regulations protects the right not to have one’s speech regulated on the basis of its content by sniffing
out improper government motivations and insufficient government interests. For
instance, as the Court explained in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the fact that “contentneutral alternatives” would serve the government’s asserted interests “cast[s] considerable doubt on the government’s [claim] that” it is pursuing the asserted interests,
rather than censoring the litigant.256 Similarly, a statute’s underinclusiveness—its
failure to regulate other speech that harms the government’s asserted interest—can
suggest either that the government is engaged in censorship257 or that the government’s
interest is insufficiently important to justify restricting the litigant’s speech.258 None
of these applications of the narrow-tailoring requirement, however, involve a litigant’s assertion of third-party rights.
means of vindicating the plaintiff’s own right not to be bound by a statute that is unconstitutional.” Id. at 485. The Court did not identify the source of that purported right. The Court
could not have derived it from the First Amendment, given its long-standing and continuing
recognition that the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the third-party standing bar that
allows a litigant to raise the First Amendment rights of others. See supra notes 122–26 and
accompanying text. And the Court almost certainly did not mean to recognize an independent
right to be free of laws that do not satisfy an applicable narrow-tailoring requirement, given its
general refusal to allow overbreadth claims outside the First Amendment context. See Salerno,
481 U.S. at 745. Most likely, the relevant statement in Fox was not meant as a substantive
reconceptualization of overbreadth doctrine. Rather, the majority meant the statement to
serve only the immediate need of justifying, in the face of a dissent, its refusal to adjudicate
a litigant’s overbreadth challenge prior to resolution of her as-applied claim. The refusal
makes sense if the overbreadth doctrine is described as a litigant-focused doctrine, rather than
as (per usual) a utilitarian doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of others’ speech. Indeed,
when the Court has relied on the relevant passage from Fox, it has done so only in support
of the proposition that an overbreadth claim should not be resolved unless the litigant’s asapplied claim has failed. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 478
(1995); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324 (1991).
255
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
256
Id. Alternatively, the existence of content-neutral alternatives can be viewed as indicating that content-based regulation of the litigant’s speech is unneeded, and thus violative
of the litigant’s right not to have her speech regulated on the basis of its content.
257
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740 (2011); Police Dep’t
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96–102 (1972).
258
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015).
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More to the point here, a litigant also can argue that a law fails a narrow-tailoring
requirement because it is “overinclusive.” In this respect, too, the narrow-tailoring
requirement protects the litigant’s personal right. These arguments typically go as
follows: a litigant shows that her speech falls within the scope of First Amendment
protection, and, as a result, the government can apply a law curtailing her speech only
if doing so is sufficiently tied to achieving an important or compelling interest. Thus,
as Justice Scalia explained for the Court in Board of Trustees v. Fox, “[t]he person
invoking . . . [a] narrow-tailoring rule asserts that the [constitutionally protected]
acts of [hers] that are the subject of the litigation fall outside what a properly drawn
prohibition could cover.”259 The law, she claims, cannot constitutionally extend to
her.260 But, because the narrow-tailoring requirement serves to protect personal constitutional rights, “[a] successful attack upon a . . . speech restriction on narrowtailoring grounds . . . does not assure a defense to those whose own [speech] can be
constitutionally proscribed.”261 When they operate in this fashion, narrow-tailoring
requirements serve to protect litigants’ personal free speech rights. They do not create
a right to object to laws on the ground that they may be applied to violate the First
Amendment rights of third parties.
There is another way in which a litigant might make an argument premised on
a statute’s overinclusiveness. Specifically, a litigant might argue that a regulation
cannot be applied to him, even if application to him would further the government’s
asserted interest, because the regulation is overinclusive in a manner that suggests
the government is not actually pursuing that interest, but instead is impermissibly
targeting him based on hostility to his message (or favoritism to a competing message). The Court describes the narrow-tailoring test in this way only infrequently,
but it can be employed to serve this function.262 When so employed, the narrowtailoring requirement could allow the litigant to rely on the fact that the law reaches
hypothetical third-party speech to which it should not extend.
259

Fox, 492 U.S. at 482; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 & n.8 (1980) (distinguishing between narrow tailoring and overbreadth on this basis); cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502–04 (1985)
(distinguishing between as-applied and overbreadth First Amendment challenges, and insisting that a litigant should be able to assert third-party rights via an overbreadth challenge
only after an as-applied challenge has failed).
260
Relatedly, a litigant might argue that, even if her speech can be regulated, the government’s chosen regulation fails the narrow-tailoring test because the government could pursue
its interests through regulations that would be less restrictive of her speech. See Sable
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128–31 (1989). In this context, too, the narrowtailoring analysis is tied to the litigant’s personal right to freedom of speech.
261
Fox, 492 U.S. at 482–83.
262
When the Court has viewed a statute’s overinclusiveness as casting doubt on the
government’s asserted interest, that overinclusiveness usually has been accompanied by
significant statutory underinclusiveness. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362
(2010); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 396–97 (1984); First Nat’l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793–95 (1978).
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Even this use of a narrow-tailoring test would not reflect a First Amendment right
to be free of laws that would violate the free speech rights of third parties if applied
to them. Instead, it would serve only to protect the litigant’s personal right to free
speech. In other words, the litigant could rely on the law’s overinclusive application
to third parties only if the nature of the overinclusiveness—the mismatch between the
law’s scope and the government’s asserted interests—indicated that the government
was engaging in impermissible content-based regulation of the litigant’s speech. Thus,
someone engaged in speech falling within an unprotected category would be unable
to challenge a generally applicable law, or a law generally aimed at the unprotected
speech, on the ground that it could be applied to third parties who engaged in protected
speech. For example, a speaker of fighting words could not challenge a breach of the
peace statute or a statute barring abusive language on the ground that it could be applied
to those who did not utter fighting words,263 and a purveyor of child pornography
could not challenge a statute aimed at outlawing child pornography on the ground
that it could be applied to movies or books dealing with adolescent sex.264 These
challenges would fail because the government may regulate categorically unprotected speech based on the content element that renders it unprotected, and because
nothing about the laws’ application to related, but protected, speech suggests that
the government is targeting the litigant’s speech on some other basis.265
A litigant engaged in fully protected speech would face a similar barrier in mounting
a challenge based on a statute’s overinclusive application to third parties. If application of the law to the litigant is sufficiently tied to the government’s interest—that
is, if her actions fall within the scope of what a properly drawn statute would cover—she
could succeed in relying on the statute’s overinclusiveness only if something about
the mismatch between the government’s asserted interest and the law’s scope indicated that the government was not actually pursuing its asserted interest, but instead
was engaged in impermissible content discrimination. Such circumstances likely
would arise infrequently, but they can be imagined. For instance, if a law forbid “all
visual, aural, or written depictions of criminal activity,” an admitted criminal who
sold his story for profit might succeed in arguing that the government sought to
stifle depictions of criminality, rather than to pursue an asserted interest in ensuring
that criminals do not profit from their crimes.266 A litigant, however, could not rely
263

But see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (finding a statute barring
“opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace,” overbroad
at the behest of a litigant who threatened to kill police officers).
264
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 766–74 (1982) (rejecting child pornographer’s
overbreadth claim and concluding that that statute’s overinclusiveness should be cured
through case-by-case adjudication).
265
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386, 388 (1992).
266
This example is loosely based on Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State
Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991). The Court in that case, however, did not suggest
that the challenged law’s overinclusive scope cast doubt on the government’s asserted interests, which the Court accepted as compelling. See id. at 118–19; see also infra note 267.
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on a law’s overinclusive application to third parties—even a substantial number of
third parties—if that overinclusiveness suggested only that the government pursued
proper interests overzealously, or with insufficient precision. In that scenario, in
other words, the litigant could not succeed in arguing that application of the law to
third parties would fail narrow tailoring and, thus, violate their free speech rights.
The statute’s lack of narrow tailoring, in short, would not show that the litigant’s
own free speech rights were being violated.267
In sum, the First Amendment protects personal rights, and the various narrowtailoring requirements serve to protect those rights. Neither the First Amendment
nor its associated narrow-tailoring requirements create the sort of right on which the
valid-rule approach is premised. Given that fact, the valid-rule approach can work
only if some other source creates a freestanding right-to-a-valid-rule that extends
to First Amendment cases.
No other provision of the Constitution supplies that sort of right. To be sure, the
Due Process Clauses have been held to create a personal right to freedom from
arbitrary or irrational applications of law,268 but that minimally protective personal
right cannot serve as a basis for the valid-rule approach. After all, application of a
law can be entirely rational and nonarbitrary even if the law includes within its
sweep, a great deal of third-party conduct that is protected by the Constitution. For
instance, assume that a law prohibits the transmission of obscene or indecent
materials to one known to be a minor. Application of that law to some people—say
267
To be sure, the Court has not been clear on these points. Some of its opinions indicate
that application of an insufficiently tailored law to a litigant violates that litigant’s First
Amendment rights, even absent a showing that a narrowly-tailored law would not reach the
litigant or that the law is overinclusive in a way that suggests that the government is actually
targeting the speaker based on hostility to the content of her message. See, e.g., Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 121–23; see also Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. 947, 965 n.13 (1984) (equating narrow-tailoring requirement and overbreadth doctrine);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (treating narrow-tailoring requirement as
touchstone in overbreadth case). Given the existence of overbreadth doctrine, this lack of
clarity is unsurprising. Because overbreadth doctrine allows litigants to challenge a law on
the ground that it could be applied to violate the free speech rights of third parties, courts
have little reason to consider whether a statute’s overinclusive application to third parties
indicates a violation of the litigant’s own free speech rights. In short, overbreadth doctrine
has infected the Court’s application of the narrow-tailoring standards. See, e.g., Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (relying on overbreadth doctrine to
conclude that litigants had standing to rely on challenged statute’s overinclusive application
to third parties). When the narrow-tailoring standards are understood on their own and
without the influence of overbreadth doctrine, however, it becomes clear that those standards
do not create a broad, first-party right to object to statutes on the ground that they could be
applied to violate the rights of third parties. Were it otherwise, the Court’s repeated insistences
that First Amendment rights are personal, and that the overbreadth doctrine is a special rule
of standing that allows litigants to assert the free speech rights of others, would make no
sense. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
268
See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1988).
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those who transmitted indecent materials to minors with the permission of the minor’s
parents—might violate the First Amendment.269 But if the government showed that
a defendant transmitted obscenity to someone he knew to be a minor, it would be
rational to apply the law to the defendant. Doing so would serve the government’s
legitimate interest in protecting children.270
Others, most notably Professor Monaghan, have sought to justify the valid-rule
approach as a long-standing principle reflected in the Supreme Court’s cases.271 But
none of the relied-upon cases recognize a freestanding right to be judged only in
accordance with a rule that could be applied constitutionally to others. Most of
these cases involve as-applied challenges in which the Court was forced to evaluate
the facial validity of an arguably overbroad law due to circumstances that made it
impossible for the Court to determine whether the defendant had been convicted for
constitutionally protected conduct.272 In other words, the Court evaluated the challenged law on its face out of necessity, and not because the litigant had a right to
insist that the law be valid as applied to others.
In other cases, the Court simply deemed a statute broadly invalid in the course
of holding that it was invalid as applied to a litigant in the case at hand. For instance, in Marbury v. Madison,273 the Supreme Court rejected Marbury’s request
269

Cf. Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding Communications
Decency Act overbroad, in part because it prohibited transmission of indecent materials to
minors even where the parents consented).
270
Contrary to Professor Dorf’s novel suggestion, the Supremacy Clause does not create
a right to be judged only in accordance with a rule that can be validly applied to others. See
Dorf, supra note 16, at 248. The Supremacy Clause says only that federal law is “supreme”
when it applies. U.S. CONST. art. VI. It creates no freestanding constitutional right, see
Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979), and says nothing about
the substance of the federal rights that it makes supreme.
271
See Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 8–14.
272
See Dorf, supra note 16, at 243 n.31 (discussing Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564
(1970) (multiple potential bases for conviction, conflicting evidence, and jury returned general
verdict); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (two theories of prosecution,
conflicting evidence, and jury returned general verdict); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949) (multiple possible bases for conviction, and jury returned general verdict);
Ulster Cty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) (defendant may challenge a mandatory
presumption even if there was sufficient evidence to support conviction, because it is impossible to tell whether the defendant was convicted on the basis of the unconstitutional
presumption); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940) (basing decision to entertain
facial challenge on two rationales, one of which was that the charging document tracked
language of overbroad statute, and the court returned a general verdict that did not specify
the testimony on which it relied)). Professor Monaghan also relies on Thompson v. City of
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), but in that case the Court held only that the challenged
conviction “violated due process because there was no evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”
Dorf, supra note 16, at 243 n.29.
273
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), as discussed in Dorf, supra note 16, at 246–47, and
Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, supra note 16, at
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that the Court exercise its original jurisdiction to grant him a mandamus because
Congress had no power to authorize him to make that request to the Supreme Court.274
To be sure, the Court’s opinion made sweeping statements concerning the invalidity
of the statutory provision that purported to authorize Marbury’s request.275 But the
case itself involved a straightforward as-applied assessment of Madison’s argument
that the statutory provision could not constitutionally give the Court jurisdiction to
direct a mandamus to him in the specific proceedings initiated by Marbury.276 Given
stare decisis, it is unsurprising that the Court would recognize that the basis for its
decision that a law violates a litigant’s rights can effectively render the law invalid
in other applications.277 Such decisions do not, however, support the position that
a litigant can resist application of a law to him on the ground that it would violate
the rights of third parties if applied to them.
In still other cases, the Court held only that a specific constitutional right—the
right to procedural due process—required facial evaluation of the law creating the
procedure. In these cases, including Wuchter v. Pizzutti,278 the Court took the view
that the Due Process Clauses created an individual right to be deprived of property
only pursuant to an established regulatory scheme that, as written, provided sufficient procedural guarantees.279 The reasoning was that due process could not be
provided through an exercise of extra-statutory “favor or discretion.”280 That articulation of the due process right required the Court to evaluate challenged laws on
their face without regard to whether the individual litigant had actually received
adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard.281 Whatever their merit, these cases
1331–32 (relying on Marbury in arguing that the valid-rule requirement “lie[s] in the history
and structure of the Constitution and in the deeper values that the Constitution serves”).
274
See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173–80.
275
See id. at 177 (“If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does
it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?”).
276
See supra note 240 (noting that structural provisions of the Constitution may be asserted by individuals). Similarly, in Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931) (cited in Monaghan,
Overbreadth, supra note 16, at 12), the Court held that a private motor carrier could not be
convicted under a state statute because the statute, depending on how it was interpreted,
either unconstitutionally interfered with his business or unconstitutionally failed to give him
any notice of its requirements. Id. at 563–64. The Court deemed the statute “invalid upon its
face,” but that conclusion was only the necessary result of the basis for the Court’s holding
that the statute violated the carrier’s constitutional rights. Id. at 562, 567.
277
See Sedler, supra note 15, at 611 (“There are some statutes that are declared unconstitutional on grounds that make it clear that they can never be constitutionally applied.”).
278
276 U.S. 13 (1928).
279
See, e.g., id. at 18–19; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424–25 (1915);
Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900); Mont. Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152
U.S. 160, 170–72 (1894).
280
Roller, 176 U.S. at 409 (“The right of a citizen to due process of law must rest upon
a basis more substantial than favor or discretion.”).
281
See Wuchter, 276 U.S. at 18–19; Coe, 237 U.S. at 424–25; Roller, 176 U.S. at 398,
407–09.
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reflect only the Court’s substantive interpretation of the individual right to procedural due process.282 That is, they are not reflective of a general right to be judged
under laws that could be applied validly to others. For proof of that point, one need
only look to Clark283 and the myriad other cases from the same era in which the
Court rejected litigants’ arguments that a law could not be applied to them because
its application to others would be invalid.284
In sum, the valid-rule approach depends on the existence of a right to be free of
laws that are unconstitutional as applied to others. The First Amendment itself
creates no such right. And neither the Constitution nor the Court’s cases create an
independent right to a valid rule. Thus, the valid-rule approach cannot serve to recharacterize the overbreadth doctrine as a doctrine premised on the assertion of
first-party rights.
B. Jus Tertii Inseverability Doctrine as a Surrogate for Overbreadth
Under the preceding analysis, are we left without a means of achieving results
similar to those now generated by overbreadth doctrine? Not necessarily, because
jus tertii inseverability doctrine provides a possible avenue for doing so.285 Unlike
overbreadth doctrine, jus tertii inseverability doctrine grounds judicial decisionmaking in the design of a substantive lawmaker—that is, the lawmakers who created
the challenged statute.286 Specifically, a holding of inseverability amounts to judicial recognition of—and deference to—a decision by the lawmakers to confer on
every person to whom the statute applies a right to challenge it on the asserted
282

Marc Isserles has identified cases that involve what he refers to as “valid rule facial
challenge[s],” in which a litigant argues that the terms of a challenged statute “contain[ ] a
constitutional infirmity that invalidates the statute in its entirety.” Isserles, supra note 16, at
387. In most of those cases, the Court reached a substantive conclusion that the content of
the personal constitutional right asserted by the litigant altogether barred application of the
type of law challenged by the litigant. See id. at 390–94, 405 n.205, 411–12 (identifying,
inter alia, cases involving laws that imposed prior restraints or licensing schemes without
required safeguards were entirely vague, or imposed a poll tax). (In other cases identified by
Isserles, the Court combined the overbreadth doctrine and the concept of narrow tailoring,
see supra note 267, or applied the overbreadth doctrine outside of the First Amendment
context, see supra note 123.) Like the procedural due process cases discussed in the text,
these valid-rule-facial-challenge cases turned on the Court’s conclusion that the substance
of a particular constitutional right rendered certain sorts of laws inherently invalid. See
Isserles, supra note 16, at 396 (contrasting valid-rule facial challenges with overbreadth
challenges by noting that “the valid rule facial challenge . . . necessarily includes the claim
that the statute is unconstitutional in its application against the litigant”). They did not, however, recognize a free-floating right to be judged only in accordance with a rule that could
be applied validly to others.
283
Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114 (1900).
284
See supra notes 84–90, 100 and accompanying text.
285
See supra notes 75–99 and accompanying text.
286
See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
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grounds. Long before the rise of the prudential conception of third-party standing,
the Supreme Court considered such challenges,287 and there is no reason why courts
could not do so once again.
A court faced with such a challenge would enjoy flexibility in its decisional sequencing. In most cases, the court first should address whether the statute’s allegedly invalid applications are in fact inseverable from its application to the litigant
and should only go on to address the validity of challenged third-party applications
if they are inseverable. A conclusion that the creator of the challenged law intended
its allegedly invalid aspects to be severable would amount to a holding that the creator
of the law did not authorize the litigant to assert the rights on which her jus tertii inseverability argument is based. As a result, the litigant’s claim would fail on the merits.
In taking that severability-first approach, the court would be following long-standing
precedent. In Presser v. Illinois,288 for instance, the Court rejected an inseverabilitybased argument on severability grounds.289 As the Court put matters, it was not
“necessary to consider or decide the question . . . raised as to the validity of the entire [challenged law], for . . . the sections under which the plaintiff in error was convicted may be valid, even if the other sections of the [challenged law] were invalid.”290
That severability-first approach has much to commend it. For instance, where
a jus tertii inseverability argument is premised on a statute’s alleged conflict with
the federal Constitution, the severability-first approach honors the general policy
of the federal courts not “to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.”291 And, no matter the basis for the jus
tertii inseverability argument, a severability-first decisional sequencing would serve
the policy interests that animate the current prudential rule against third-party
standing better than a severability-second sequencing. First, a severability-first
decisional sequence avoids unnecessary adjudication of third-party rights,292 thereby
minimizing the “premature interpretation[ ] of statutes in areas where” the validity
of “their . . . application might be cloudy.”293 Second, a severability-first decisional
sequencing minimizes the possibility that a jus tertii inseverability adjudication
would unnecessarily create adverse, and potentially erroneous, precedent that might
287

See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
116 U.S. 252 (1886).
289
Id. at 263–64.
290
Id. at 263; see also, e.g., Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513 (1937);
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234–35 (1932); Bd. of Trade
v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 42 (1923); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 695–96
(1892); In re Penniman, 103 U.S. 714, 716–17 (1880).
291
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)).
292
See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976) (plurality opinion).
293
See, e.g., Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson, Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984) (quoting
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)).
288

2015]

THE MERITS OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING

325

prejudice third-party right-holders.294 Third, if it is true that “third parties . . . usually
will be the best proponents of their own rights,” a severability-first approach will
align with courts’ “prefer[ence] to construe legal rights only when the most effective advocates of those rights are before them.”295
On the other hand, nothing would require a court to address the severability
issue first. The question of severability and the question of whether the allegedly
invalid aspects of the challenged law are in fact invalid both go to the merits, and
they therefore need not be rigidly sequenced. Indeed, a severability-second decisional sequence might be appropriate in some circumstances. A court could gauge
the advisability of a severability-second sequencing by considering several factors,
including, at least, the following: (1) the ease with which the validity of third-party
applications can be resolved;296 (2) the difficulty of resolving the severability question; and (3) whether the opposing party has disputed the challenger’s assertion of
inseverability.297 In short, a court would enjoy the flexibility to structure its decisional sequence in a manner appropriate to the case before it.
There remains the question of whether jus tertii inseverability doctrine would
fill the void created by overbreadth’s demise in any meaningful sense. In at least
one respect, jus tertii inseverability doctrine offers more opportunities for litigants
to succeed in challenging statutes on the ground that they would be invalid as applied to others. Specifically, jus tertii inseverability arguments can be made even
outside the First Amendment context in which the overbreadth doctrine generally
applies. That is so because jus tertii inseverability doctrine focuses on the intent of
the lawmakers who created the challenged law. A lawmaker’s intent concerning the
severability of its handiwork likely will not turn on the source of the right resulting
in partial invalidity, as opposed to the extent of invalidity or the importance of the
invalid aspects to the statutory design.298 Thus, jus tertii inseverability arguments
294

See, e.g., Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113–14.
See, e.g., id. at 114.
296
See Sedler, supra note 15, at 612.
297
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–42 (2009) (stating that similar considerations should guide courts in deciding which of the two aspects of qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first).
298
It is possible that a lawmaker’s desire for severability would vary according to the source
of the rights allegedly violated by its statute. For instance, perhaps a lawmaker would be more
inclined toward inseverability if its law invaded constitutional, as opposed to statutory, rights.
Cf. Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683 (2013) (discussing ways
in which courts have afforded constitutional claims greater protection than is afforded to
other claims). That possibility seems unlikely, or at least likely unusual, and it thus seems
normatively preferable to treat constitutionally based and non-constitutionally based jus tertii
inseverability arguments identically, absent a showing of legislative intent to the contrary.
It is worth noting, though, that jus tertii inseverability doctrine would operate similarly to the
current overbreadth doctrine if courts were to assume that lawmakers will be more inclined
toward inseverability when free speech rights are at stake. Under that approach, jus tertii
inseverability doctrine would amount to a special presumption of inseverability in the free
295
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can be premised on any constitutional right or on rights created by a federal statute
or a state’s constitution or laws.
Nevertheless, there is reason to fear that the jus tertii inseverability doctrine will
serve as only a weak surrogate for overbreadth doctrine. For more than a century, jus
tertii inseverability arguments have rarely succeeded, a state of affairs almost certainly attributable to the robust presumption of severability.299 As long as the Court
adheres to that presumption, most jus tertii inseverability arguments are sure to fail.
That said, the Court’s adherence to its current articulation of the presumption
is not a foregone conclusion. The Constitution does not mandate the presumption
of severability, much less the extreme form of the presumption that has taken hold
in the Court’s decisions. Moreover, it is at least arguable that a legislature would
not want its statute to stand simply because one, a few, or even a substantial number
of its provisions or applications would be valid. And the Court need not fear that a
relaxation of the presumption would trench irrevocably on congressional or state
authority. The presumption is merely a default, and Congress or a state, therefore, could
make its desire for severability known through the simple expedient of a strongly
worded severability clause.300 Perhaps these considerations would lead the Court to
relax the presumption of severability in the absence of overbreadth doctrine. Perhaps
not, as the Court’s current posture of extreme restraint has its own virtues, including
maximized preservation of the handiwork of Congress and the states. The point here
is that the Court will need to address these issues if it abandons the overbreadth
doctrine and would like some other doctrine to fill the resulting void.301
speech context. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text (noting that application of
overbreadth doctrine results in inseverability). This approach to jus tertii inseverability,
however, would differ from overbreadth doctrine in at least one material respect: because jus
tertii inseverability doctrine turns on legislative intent, a legislature could rebut any special
presumption of inseverability.
299
See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
300
See Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 42 (1923) (refusing to decide validity of provisions of challenged statutes that affected third parties where strongly worded severability
clause made plain that those provisions were severable); see also Elec. Bond & Share Co.
v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 432–39 (1938); Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513
(1937). Because courts would be required to defer to these severability clauses, legislatures
would be able to insulate their handiwork from jus tertii inseverability challenges. For that
reason, jus tertii inseverability doctrine might prove much less potent than the current overbreadth doctrine.
301
In this paragraph, I have put aside the possibility that state law might independently
impose a higher or lower threshold of severability. In that circumstance, a federal court
should defer to the state severability law, as it would determine the scope of rights assertable
by the litigant making the jus tertii inseverability argument. A state, therefore, could minimize the likelihood that jus tertii inseverability challenges to its laws would succeed by
adopting a strong presumption of severability. In contrast, a state can avoid a federal court
overbreadth challenge to its statute only by adopting an authoritative narrowing construction
before the federal challenge. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490–91 (1965).
Insofar as it allows states greater flexibility to insulate their laws from facial challenge, jus
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Another hurdle may exist when it comes to jus tertii inseverability challenges
to state laws in federal court. Because the severability of state statutes is a matter
of state law, a litigant making a jus tertii inseverability argument would, in effect,
be asserting a state-law right.302 To be sure, it might look like the litigant is asserting
a federal right if the jus tertii inseverability argument is premised on the federal
rights of third parties. But that right would be his to assert only because state law
authorized him to assert it.303 That raises the question whether a case involving a jus
tertii inseverability challenge to a state law—premised on the federal rights of third
parties—would “aris[e] under” federal law within the meaning of Article III’s jurisdictional grant.
That concern is unfounded.304 As earlier observed, the Court has held that
Article III’s Arising Under Clause encompasses (at least) those cases that necessarily involve a question of federal law.305 More specifically, the Court has recognized
that a case involving a state-law right of action arises under federal law within the
meaning of Article III if the state-law claim requires resolution of federal-law
issues,306 and, relatedly, that it has “arising under” jurisdiction to review federal questions that crop up in the course of a state court’s resolution of a state-law claim.307
Jus tertii inseverability challenges to state statutes premised on federal rights of
course require resolution of federal-law issues—that is, whether the challenged statute violates federal rights—and they therefore “arise under” federal law within the
meaning of Article III. It is possible that some jus tertii inseverability challenges to
state laws might not arise under federal law within the Court’s current, more stringent interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.308 But that obstacle is surmountable: the Court
tertii inseverability doctrine might prove a less potent litigating tool than overbreadth doctrine for challengers of state laws.
302
See Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1083.
303
Id.
304
Even if jus tertii inseverability challenges to state laws were held not to “arise under”
federal law, a litigant could assert such a claim in federal court in a diversity case, under
another party-based font of jurisdiction, or as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction in a case
where the litigant asserted his own federal rights in challenging the state law. See supra notes
224–26 and accompanying text.
305
See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
306
See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc.
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 (1986).
307
See Merrell, 478 U.S. at 816; see also, e.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 291
U.S. 205, 214 (1934). Of course, if the Supreme Court were to review a jus tertii inseverability challenge to a state law, it should respect the state court’s decision regarding the
severability of the challenged state statute in undertaking that review. See Leavitt v. Jane L.,
518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996). A lower federal court adjudicating a jus tertii inseverability
challenge to a state statute likewise would be required to respect any state law of severability.
308
Compare Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005)
(state-law claim arose under federal law within meaning of jurisdictional statute where it
involved significant issue of federal law), with Merrell, 478 U.S. 804 (holding that state-law
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could relax its interpretation of § 1331—perhaps by bringing it in line with its interpretation of Article III’s Arising Under Clause—or Congress could enact a statute
specifically granting federal district courts jurisdiction over jus tertii inseverability
challenges premised on federal rights.
The takeaway is that the Court—perhaps with some help from Congress—can
reinvigorate jus tertii inseverability doctrine. And a reinvigorated jus tertii inseverability doctrine would serve policies that animate overbreadth doctrine while remaining grounded in the designs of substantive lawmakers.
IV. THE CONTINUING VIABILITY OF JUS TERTII STANDING DOCTRINE
Can jus tertii standing survive in a post-prudential-standing world? This Part
argues that it can, but only if it is appropriately limited to function as a necessary
means of implementing the designs of right-creating lawmakers. When so limited,
application of jus tertii standing doctrine amounts to recognition of an implied firstparty right belonging to the litigant. Subpart A offers a proposed approach for identifying those instances in which an assertion of jus tertii standing can be justified in
first-party terms. Subpart B considers, and rejects, academic attempts to recast jus
tertii standing more broadly in first-party terms through the medium of substantive
due process.
A. Jus Tertii Standing Doctrine and the Limited Recognition of Implied
Legal Rights
As explained above, two competing views of the jus tertii standing doctrine’s
function—a fail-safe view and an advocate-enabling view—are at play in the Court’s
cases.309 Though obscured by the Singleton test’s facially fail-safe orientation, the
broad advocate-enabling view frequently manifests in the Court’s relaxed application
of the Singleton test, particularly its requirement that the third-party right-holder
face some “genuine obstacle” to assertion of her rights.310 In effect, the advocateenabling view works behind the scenes, leading the Court to freely allow litigants
to assert the rights of third parties.
The problem is that the advocate-enabling view is divorced from the designs of
right-creating lawmakers. Indeed, when it serves a purely advocate-enabling function,
jus tertii standing doctrine runs contrary to those designs because it allows litigants
action incorporating federal statutory standard did not “arise under” federal law for purpose
of federal-question statute, based largely on Congress’s refusal to provide cause of action for
violation of federal standard). But see Dorf, supra note 16, at 250 n.57 (arguing without
reservation that “a litigant whose own conduct is not constitutionally protected [may] bring
a facial challenge to a state statute in federal court,” even assuming “the absence of a valid
rule requirement”).
309
See supra notes 146–69 and accompanying text.
310
See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 316 (1990).
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to assert third-party rights even absent circumstances demonstrating that an assertion of jus tertii standing is needed to effectuate the lawmaker’s design. In short, the
advocate-enabling view expands judicial power at the expense of the nonjudicial power
to define rights. For those reasons, the advocate-enabling view of the jus tertii standing
doctrine’s function is inconsistent with an understanding that issues of so-called thirdparty standing go to the merits of the litigant’s claim or defense and, accordingly,
require deference to the law-making body that created the claim or defense.
None of this means that jus tertii standing doctrine is poised for interment. It
can serve two other functions—a fail-safe function and an anti-evasion function—that
effectuate, rather than subvert, the designs of right-creating lawmakers. When confined to serve those functions, jus tertii standing involves a judicial conclusion that
the legal provision creating the asserted third-party right creates an implied right
belonging to the litigant. And, because that implied right is grounded in the legal
provision creating the asserted third-party right and the design of the lawmakers
who created that provision, judicial enforcement of the implied right is consistent
with courts’ obligation to respect the designs of right-creating lawmakers.
The difficulty lies in imposing strict limits that will confine jus tertii standing
doctrine to its proper fail-safe and anti-evasion functions. I endeavor below to define
those functions, with a view toward mapping the circumstances311 in which an
assertion of jus tertii standing would serve one of them.312
311

I agree that “the presence or absence of” a specific relationship of interdependence
between the litigant and the right-holder should not “matter for third-party standing except
as it bears on the causal link” between “derivative injury to the litigant and impairment of the
third party’s rights.” TRIBE, supra note 16, at 440 & n.38. Assuming the existence of that
causal link and of the circumstances discussed in the text, the jus tertii standing doctrine serves
its fail-safe and anti-evasion functions whether or not the litigant has a preexisting relationship with particular third-party right-holders, and whether or not that relationship can be
described as “special.” But see Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 131–32 (2004) (denying jus
tertii standing based in part on litigants’ lack of a current relationship with right-holders);
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989) (suggesting that
the relationship must be of “special consequence”).
312
The following discussion assumes that the litigant is seeking to assert the rights of third
parties under federal law. Whether the litigant enjoys an implied right under the provision
creating the asserted third-party right is a substantive question of federal law. Therefore, the
standards discussed below would bind both state and federal courts, taking away any ability
to permit or deny jus tertii standing as a matter of “prudence.” See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
A state court would err in allowing a litigant jus tertii standing where those standards were
not met, if the court based its decision on federal law. However, a state could allow broader
jus tertii standing as a matter of state law. In that circumstance, the non-right-holding litigant
would be asserting a state-law claim or defense, which might be premised on federal rights
belonging in the first instance to third parties. The Supreme Court questioned the propriety
of that practice in U.S. Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 n.** (1990), but
it did not explain why states would be barred from creating such state-law rights, and basic
principles of federalism dictate that they have authority to do so. The ability of litigants to
assert in federal court state-law jus tertii standing claims premised on federal rights would
track the ability of litigants to assert in federal court state-law jus tertii inseverability claims
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First, the jus tertii standing doctrine serves a fail-safe function when the judicial
process does not offer a route through which right-holders can secure their own
rights. The operative premise is that, when a lawmaker grants a legal right to specified right-holders, it intends for those right-holders to be able to enjoy that right if
they so choose. As a corollary, the lawmaker does not intend for right-holders to be
denied enjoyment of the right simply because some inherent feature of the judicial
system makes it impossible for right-holders to vindicate the right through the
courts. Thus, the key to confining jus tertii standing doctrine to its proper fail-safe
role lies in identifying those situations in which the judicial system does not offer
third-party right-holders an avenue to protection of their rights.
In my view, the answer sounds in justiciability doctrine. Specifically, courts
should allow a litigant to invoke the jus tertii standing doctrine’s fail-safe function
only where the litigant can show that a justiciability barrier would prevent an
individual right-holder from securing his right through the judicial process of trial
and appeal. In that circumstance an allowance of jus tertii standing would effectuate
the lawmakers’ design by ensuring that individual right-holders will not lose out on
their rights simply because they cannot secure them through the courts. But if no
justiciability obstacles prevent individual right-holders from effectively securing
their rights through the court system, application of the jus tertii standing doctrine
undermines the right-creating lawmakers’ decision to create a personal right belonging to third parties.
What does it mean for individual right-holders to face justiciability barriers that
prevent them from securing their own rights through the court system? Individual
right-holders would face justiciability barriers where the asserted right is timebound, such that an individual right-holder’s claim as a practical matter would be
mooted—and the right lost—during the course of litigation. For instance, in Craig
v. Boren,313 the asserted right was the right of eighteen- to twenty-year-old males to
be treated equally with their female peers. Because an individual male’s claim would
become moot when he turned twenty-one, he would have only three years from the
date the challenged law became applicable to him to vindicate his right in court—
not long enough for his suit to work its way through the legal system.314 And because the individual right-holder’s right would be lost when he turned twenty-one,
a class action would avail him nothing, even if it might ensure that other males
premised on federal rights. See supra notes 303–08 and accompanying text. No matter the
basis for jurisdiction, a federal court should not revisit a state’s decision to allow a litigant
jus tertii standing, as to do so would be to override without warrant the state’s decision
regarding the scope of rights available to the litigant as a matter of state law. See supra note
307 (in discussing state-law jus tertii inseverability claims, noting that federal courts should
respect the state’s law governing severability).
313
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
314
See id. at 192 (noting that the male plaintiff’s claim was mooted when he turned twentyone). An allowance of anti-evasion jus tertii standing would also have been appropriate in
Craig. See infra notes 329–45 and accompanying text.
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could enjoy their rights. An individual woman asserting her right to obtain an abortion would face similar barriers, as her claim would not be ripe until she became
pregnant,315 and her right to obtain an abortion would be lost within nine months of
that date.316 And because no legal doctrine can change the limited duration of pregnancy, neither the possibility of a class action nor the capable-of-repetition-yetevading-review exception to mootness would help an individual woman to secure
her right through the courts. In situations like these, granting jus tertii standing to
a non-right-holding litigant who does not face similar justiciability barriers ensures
that individual right-holders can enjoy the rights they have been granted by the
right-creating lawmaker.
As just shown, some of the Court’s decisions are consistent with the suggested
approach. That said, the suggested approach would require the Court to revisit much
of its jus tertii standing case law. Most obviously, the suggested approach is inconsistent with the Court’s decision in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
in which the Court allowed a law firm to assert its client’s right to counsel despite
recognizing that criminal defendants faced no obstacle that would prevent them from
securing that right in court.317 The suggested approach also would require the Court
to revisit its reasoning in Powers v. Ohio, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, Georgia
v. McCollum, and Campbell v. Louisiana, in which the Court held that litigants
could assert the equal protection rights of excluded jurors because those jurors would
have little financial incentive to vindicate their own rights in court.318 And, under
the suggested approach, the contraceptive provider in Carey v. Population Services,
International319 would not have been permitted fail-safe jus tertii standing320 to
assert the rights of its potential customers,321 as those customers could have secured
315

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 128–29 (1973).
See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976) (plurality opinion).
317
See 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989).
318
See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 398–400 (1998); Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 56 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991); Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414–15 (1991). I do not mean to suggest that the litigants in these
cases should have failed on the merits of their arguments. I mean only to say that the claims
in these cases should have been evaluated, and accepted or rejected, in first-party terms. See
Rohr, supra note 16, at 427–28 (suggesting that a claim of discriminatory jury selection
should be understood as the defendant’s assertion of his own constitutional rights).
319
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
320
A grant of jus tertii standing to the contraceptive provider would have served an antievasion function. See infra notes 329–45 and accompanying text.
321
One caveat. The distributor arguably should have been permitted to assert the rights
of its potential customers who were not yet sixteen years of age. Had an individual rightholder attempted to assert his right to obtain contraceptives despite his age, he might have
found his claim mooted, and his right lost, through the simple passage of time. If that is so,
allowance of jus tertii standing would have served a proper fail-safe function. The discussion
in the text refers to those customers who were over the age of sixteen and thus subject to the
provision of the challenged law prohibiting anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to distribute
contraceptives to persons who were sixteen years old or older. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 681.
316
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their rights by challenging the allegedly unconstitutional law themselves.322 Although the Court concluded that circumstances made it unlikely that the rightholders in Powers, Edmonson, McCollum, Campbell, and Carey would assert their
rights in court, those circumstances did not prevent the right-holders from securing
their rights through the judicial process. Rather, they were the sort of practical factors that regularly influence a potential plaintiff’s decision to file suit, the adjustment of
which our system entrusts to Congress, and not the federal courts.
This approach will narrow the circumstances in which a litigant can assert thirdparty rights to challenge a law in a pre-enforcement suit. That might raise concerns
that the non-right-holding litigant would suffer derivative harm while waiting for
a right-holder to challenge the problematic law and that the harm to the litigant
would, eventually, injure the right-holders themselves. Though the Court that decided it did not treat it as a jus tertii standing case,323 Pierce has been used to illustrate
this concern: the private school litigants in that case were facing declining enrollment due to the law prohibiting parents from sending their children to private schools,
and the private schools, therefore, might have been forced to close before parents
or pupils challenged the law.324 The schools would suffer harm, and, as a result,
parents and pupils who wished to exercise their right to access a private school
would also suffer harm.325
That policy consideration, though understandable, is both beside the point and
overstated. As an initial matter, to allow concern for derivatively injured litigants
to shape jus tertii standing doctrine would be inconsistent with the principle that judges
must defer to lawmakers’ decisions to create personal rights and with the corresponding
principle that courts should respect right-holders’ choices regarding whether to
assert their rights or risk their loss or impairment.326 And the argument that derivative harm to the non-right-holding litigant might redound to right-holders through
deprivation of the litigant’s services does not change that conclusion, so long as the
right-holders do not face justiciability barriers to securing their rights through the
judicial process. If right-holders choose not to assert the personal rights that they
have been granted despite the availability of judicial relief—a choice given them
by the law-making body that created the right—courts must respect that decision.327
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See id. at 683–84 & n.4.
See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
324
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See TRIBE, supra note 16, at 439 & nn.36–37; Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional
Jus Tertii, supra note 16, at 433–34.
326
See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479 (2006) (“[I]f and when the
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assert their rights or risk their loss is confirmed by a variety of unexceptionable doctrines.
See, e.g., United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 9 (2008) (statute of
limitations); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (forfeiture).
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In any event, the concern for derivatively injured, non-right-holding potential
litigants is overstated. If the right in question is valued by right-holders, it is safe to
assume that at least one right-holder will seek to protect her right in court. Even if
no right-holder immediately steps forward, the non-right-holding, would-be litigant
should have little difficulty locating a right-holder—such as a current or potential
customer—willing to challenge the problematic law. By executing an affidavit
making clear that it would supply that right-holding plaintiff with the requested
products or services, the non-right-holding potential litigant could obviate any concerns that the right-holding plaintiff might fail to satisfy the Article III requirements
of causation and redressability. Moreover, the non-right-holding, would-be litigant
should be free to help fund the right-holder’s litigation.328 In addition, once a rightholder decided to file a lawsuit challenging the problematic law, the non-right-holder
could participate as amicus curiae. Although this process might seem formalistic,
that formalism is the natural result of judicial respect for the operative rules that
right-creating lawmakers have created.
Second, jus tertii standing serves an anti-evasion function whenever the government directly regulates the litigant and, thereby, indirectly interferes with the rights
of third parties. Thus, jus tertii standing doctrine serves an anti-evasion function
when it allows a litigant to resist government action that operates on him and seeks
to: (1) prevent him from, or punish him for, participating in a third party’s exercise of
her rights; or (2) require him to interfere with a third party’s rights.329 In both scenarios,
the jus tertii standing doctrine bars the government from evading limitations placed
on its actions by third-party rights through direct regulation of non-right-holders.
Consider an example. Assume that a state prosecutes a vendor who sells contraceptives to an unmarried woman in violation of a state law that prohibits the sale
of contraceptives to anyone except individuals who are married.330 In that context,
the government’s decision to punish the vendor for refusing to discriminate against
328

The ability to fund the right-holder’s litigation could in some states be limited by prohibitions on maintenance, the giving to a litigant of “[i]mproper assistance in prosecuting or
defending a lawsuit . . . by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case.” Maintenance,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). It seems there is a strong argument that a
derivatively injured non-right-holder has a “bona fide interest” in a right-holder’s challenge
to the law that harms them both. See McIntosh v. Harbour Club Villas Condo. Ass’n, 421 So.
2d 10, 11–12 (Fla. 1982) (non-right-holders had sufficient interest where they would suffer
“adverse consequences” if the suit failed). Moreover, where the purpose of the litigation is
to vindicate civil rights, application of prohibitions on maintenance arguably would violate
the First Amendment. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (so holding, where nonprofit entity was accused of maintenance).
329
As to the possibility of required interference, indulge the farfetched assumption that
an ordinance requires all city residents to take down any pro-atheism signs that they observe
within the city limits. Because the law operates directly on the litigant and requires him to
interfere with the rights of a third party, allowance of jus tertii standing would serve an antievasion function.
330
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443–46 (1972).
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the unmarried woman amounts to an attempt to evade the equal protection rights of
the woman and others like her by operating against them indirectly.331 In short, the
government in our hypothetical is attempting to use indirect means to subvert the
design of the lawmakers who created the asserted third-party right. By allowing the
vendor to assert the right, the jus tertii standing doctrine prevents that subversion
and thereby effectuates the lawmakers’ design.332 And because the jus tertii standing
doctrine’s anti-evasion function aims to prevent indirect subversion of third-party
rights, it would allow the vendor to assert the right-holder’s right, even if right-holders
could have secured their own rights by challenging the problematic law in court. By
choosing to take action directly against the vendor, the government has placed the
focus squarely on that vendor, rather than on the right-holders and their ability, or
inability, to assert their rights.
Jus tertii standing doctrine most clearly serves this anti-evasion function when
asserted defensively by a litigant who faces liability based on her participation in, or
refusal to interfere with, a right-holder’s exercise of his rights. Barrows v. Jackson,333
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,334 Griswold v. Connecticut,335 and Eisenstadt
v. Baird336 all fit that mold.
Buchanan v. Warley337 also can be conceptualized as involving the defensive
use of jus tertii standing to serve an anti-evasion function.338 In that case, remember,
the white property vendor sought specific enforcement of his contract with an African
American vendee, who asserted a discriminatory city ordinance in defense.339 True,
the white property owner did not face liability based on his contract to sell land to
an African American.340 He did, however, face in-court, legal action—in the form
of a defense grounded in a local ordinance—that sought to bar him from carrying
out a contract through which he would participate in an African American’s exercise of his legal right to acquire property on equal terms.341 Had the city asserted the
ordinance in an action to enjoin the property owner from performing the contract,
331

This sort of evasion through indirect regulation usually will take the form of government action directly against the litigant. However, it could also take the form of a private
party’s assertion of a state-created claim or defense against the vendor.
332
Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that the government may not nullify
the constitutional right to be free from racial restrictions in voting by allowing a private
organization to run its electoral process).
333
346 U.S. 249, 256–59 (1953).
334
357 U.S. 449, 458–60 (1958).
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381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
336
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
337
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
338
I do not mean to suggest that the Court decided Buchanan on a jus tertii standing basis.
Rather, as discussed above, the Court treated Buchanan as involving the vendor’s assertion
of his own substantive due process rights. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
339
Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 60–61.
340
Id. at 71.
341
Id. at 73.
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application of the jus tertii standing doctrine to serve an anti-evasion function would
plainly have been appropriate. It should make no difference that the other party to
the contract effectively sought the same result through application of the same ordinance by a state court.
A harder question is whether allowance of jus tertii standing can be justified on
anti-evasion grounds in a pre-enforcement challenge. For instance, if a law makes
it a crime to sell beer to males, but not females,342 should a regulated distributor be
permitted to assert the rights of males before he is haled into court for violating the
law? Arguably, it is not necessary to allow the regulated, non-right-holding litigant
to assert third-party rights in that situation, given that no legal action has yet been
taken against him and the right-holders can assert their own rights in court.343 Application of jus tertii standing doctrine in this context thus could be seen as an unjustifiable deviation from the right-creating lawmaker’s decision to create a personal right.
The better position, though, is that a directly regulated litigant should be permitted jus tertii standing in a pre-enforcement challenge. The government’s decision to directly regulate the litigant squarely raises the central concern animating
the anti-evasion function—that is, that the government is impermissibly regulating
third-party right-holders indirectly through direct regulation of the litigant. And by
directly regulating the litigant, the government has made it less likely that individual
right-holders will know of and challenge the law that results in interference with their
rights, at least if the law does not also operate directly on the right-holders.344 Moreover, assuming the directly regulated litigant demonstrates that his pre-enforcement
case is justiciable—which generally means that there is a reasonable threat of
enforcement—it would be odd to say that he can assert the right-holders’ rights after
enforcement is attempted, but not before.345 That sort of dividing line might make
sense if the jus tertii standing doctrine is to remain a matter of judicial prudence, but
it is difficult to justify once it is recognized that issues of jus tertii standing require
the development of clear principles by which courts can answer the merits question
of whether, and when, a “constitutional or statutory provision . . . implies a right of
action [or defense] in the [litigant].”346
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Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191–92 (1976).
See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (alien successfully challenged law that
regulated his employer on the ground that it violated alien’s constitutional rights).
344
If the challenged law applies directly to both right-holders and the non-right-holding
litigant, a viable jus tertii inseverability challenge might be open to the litigant. See Monaghan,
supra note 8, at 292 n.88 (suggesting that Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), can
be explained on this basis).
345
Generally speaking, the federal courts do not require parties to expose themselves to liability before bringing suit to challenge threatened action. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 (2007).
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Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
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B. The “Valid-Rule” Approach in the Jus Tertii Standing Context
We have seen that scholars have sought to recast the Court’s existing overbreadth doctrine in first-party-rights terms.347 So too with the Court’s jus tertii
standing doctrine. The central premise of this “valid-rule approach” to jus tertii
standing is the existence of a freestanding “substantive due process”348 right either
to be “free from . . . harm”—that is, the loss of liberty or property—caused by
“invalid government action,”349 or to interact with others “free from unjustifiable
governmental interference.”350 According to adherents of this approach, litigants may
raise third-party rights so as to vindicate their own substantive due process rights.351
The leading theory, put forward by Professor Monaghan, posits that challenged
government action flunks rational basis review if it violates the rights of third parties,
in that the action would not serve a legitimate interest because a violation of protected rights cannot qualify as legitimate.352 Thus, a litigant asserting her own substantive due process rights would be permitted to base her claim on an argument
that the challenged government action would violate the rights of third parties, and
her odds of success would increase with the strength of the asserted third-party right.353
This valid-rule approach would allow litigants to assert third-party rights with
greater liberality than the approach proposed in this Article. The two approaches would
lead to the same result when the government has directly regulated the litigant—that
is, in the anti-evasion context. But the two approaches would lead to different results
in many cases in which the challenged law does not directly regulate the litigant.
The valid-rule approach would allow a litigant to assert third-party rights whether or
not the first-order right-holder faced obstacles to assertion of her rights. In contrast,
the approach suggested in this Article would authorize a fail-safe grant of jus tertii
standing only when individual first-order right-holders would face justiciability barriers to securing their rights through the courts.
That greater restrictiveness seems justified. To be sure, two strands of Supreme
Court case law offer support for Professor Monaghan’s approach.354 First, in Lochnerera decisions such as Buchanan355 and Pierce,356 the Court analyzed the challenged
laws’ impact on the rights of third parties in the course of holding that the laws violated
the litigants’ economic and property rights under the Due Process Clause, and, in
347
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Pierce, it did so despite the fact that the challenged law did not apply directly to the
litigant.357 Second, the Court has defined the Due Process Clauses’s protection of
“liberty” broadly; as a result, a law must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, even if it does not impinge the litigant’s fundamental rights.358 Putting those lines of cases together, it is not implausible to argue that an unregulated
litigant should be able to assert third-party rights in support of a substantive due process challenge to governmental action that harms her and allegedly infringes those thirdparty rights.359
The problem lies with Pierce.360 In that case, the Court allowed unregulated
litigants to succeed in claiming that a law was unreasonable, and thus violative of due
process, because it infringed the rights of third parties and indirectly caused harm
to the unregulated litigant in the process.361 The Pierce Court’s conclusion on that
357

In support of this point, Professor Monaghan also relies on Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915), and Buchanan, 245 U.S. 60. See Monaghan, supra note 8, at 302–03. Raich is
inapposite, as it was a straightforward first-party standing case: the litigant, an alien, successfully
argued that a statute that would force his employer to fire him on account of his alienage
violated his (the litigant’s) equal protection right to be free of discrimination and his substantive due process right to pursue his occupation. See Raich, 239 U.S. at 39. Buchanan is
harder to categorize because the Court did not make clear whether it viewed the white vendor
as directly regulated by the challenged government action. That said, the state courts in
Buchanan had applied the challenged ordinance directly to the vendor by holding that the law
barred him from enforcing his contract. Thus, Buchanan is best understood as involving the
vendor’s effort to avoid direct regulation. See supra notes 337–41 and accompanying text.
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See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1996); see also Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (“Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which
the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental
objective.”).
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The valid-rule approach, notably, would be inconsistent with the Court’s recognition that
a criminal defendant “lacks [third-party] standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress”
evidence “illegally seized from” a third party, United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731–32
(1980), and under the Fifth Amendment to suppress another’s reliable but unlawfully obtained
confession, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 n.8 (1978). See Sedler, The Assertion of
Constitutional Jus Tertii, supra note 16, at 1340–44 (arguing based on the valid-rule approach
that the Court “has improperly focused on the ‘personal’ nature of the privilege against selfincrimination”). In scenarios raising those issues, the litigant’s liberty is surely at stake. Under
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interest in violating the third party’s rights. But see Monaghan, supra note 8, at 304–10
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I take no position on whether the private school litigants in Pierce should have won the
case. Given the legal environment during the Lochner era, they might have succeeded on the
ground that the challenged law inevitably would destroy their property interest in their
businesses, which were of a sort enjoying the sanction of history. See Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973) (“In Pierce, the Court affirmed the right of private schools to exist
and operate.”).
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point was unprecedented. Indeed, it was in substantial tension with the Court’s earlier
recognition that the Due Process Clauses “ha[d] never been supposed to have any
bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals.”362
Moreover, the Pierce Court did not explain its unprecedented conclusion; the Court
did not grapple with whether, and, if so, why the Due Process Clauses should entitle an
unregulated litigant to invalidate a law on the ground that it violates the rights of
regulated third parties and, in so doing, indirectly causes him injury.363
The rule of Pierce was also short-lived. In its 1928 decision in Sprout v. City
of South Bend, the Court, without mentioning that case, again declined to allow
even a regulated litigant to assert the rights of third parties with whom he wished
to interact.364 And when it later developed exceptions to that rule, the Court tellingly
declined to base those exceptions on the litigants’ own substantive due process rights.
In Barrows, for instance, the Court discussed only whether a damages award against
a white landowner based on violation of a racially restrictive covenant violated the
equal protection rights of African American land users,365 even though the landowner asserted her own substantive due process rights.366 And, in Griswold, the Court
expressly declined to link its decision to the substantive due process rights of the
appellants,367 even though the appellants argued that the challenged law violated
their substantive due process rights to liberty and property because it violated their
patients’ rights.368 In short, the vision of first-party, substantive-due-process standing
suggested in Pierce has long since been abandoned. As the Court stated in a Fourth
Amendment standing case, “The limitations of the Due Process Clause . . . come into
play only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right
of the defendant.”369
362

Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1870).
Eschewing any such discussion, the Court instead proceeded straightaway to hold that
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Even more important, the Court’s abandonment of the Pierce approach was, and
is, correct. Nothing in the text of the Due Process Clauses suggests that their Framers
created a personal right to be free of indirect harms to “property” or “liberty” caused by
the government’s regulation of third parties in a manner that violates the third parties’
rights.370 That the Due Process Clauses create no such right is reinforced both by the
lack of decisions resting on the Pierce theory during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries and the Court’s steadfast refusal during that era to allow litigants to succeed
in asserting the rights of third parties outside of the jus tertii inseverability context.
These facts should be dispositive if courts are to defer to substantive lawmakers concerning the content of rights that they create.
The Due Process Clauses, in sum, do not create a right to be free of harm to
“liberty”—including liberty of interaction—or “property” caused indirectly by government action violating the rights of third parties. That is, they are not a vehicle for
asserting third-party rights. A contrary conclusion would go far toward undermining
two fundamental and interrelated principles of our legal order: (1) the “cardinal
principle[ ]” that rights are personal;371 and (2) the corresponding idea that a litigant
may not rely on the legal rights of third parties, “even when the very same allegedly
illegal act that affects the litigant also affects [the] third party.”372 If courts are to allow
litigants to assert rights belonging in the first instance to third parties, deference to
substantive lawmakers dictates that they should do so only where necessary to effectuate the design of the lawmakers who created the asserted third-party right. The
approach to jus tertii standing advocated in this Article would achieve that result
370

See O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 789 (1980) (in procedural
due process case, recognizing that the Due Process Clauses “do[ ] not apply to the indirect
adverse effects of governmental action”). Because a directly regulated litigant would always
have anti-evasion jus tertii standing under the approach suggested in this Article, I do not
focus on whether the Due Process Clauses create a first-party right to be free of direct
regulation that violates the rights of third parties. Others have suggested that the Clauses
create such a right. See Roosevelt, supra note 16, at 1020; see also Bond v. United States,
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the litigants’ own substantive due process rights in holding that the litigant could assert thirdparty rights. See supra notes 365–68 and accompanying text. There thus is reason to be skeptical of this direct-regulation-only view of the valid-rule approach.
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by limiting jus tertii standing to those situations in which its allowance is necessary
to serve a fail-safe or anti-evasion function. A more freewheeling approach to jus
tertii standing—like the valid-rule approach—would give courts needless license
to ignore lawmakers’ decisions to create limited, personal rights.
CONCLUSION
Professor Monaghan had it absolutely right when he observed that “we must
begin to articulate the unspoken premises of third party standing.”373 Unfortunately
for the Court’s modern doctrine, those premises, when spoken, turn out to be false:
issues of third-party standing should not be understood as matters of judicial prudence. Rather, they go to the merits of the parties’ dispute and, accordingly, call for
judicial deference to lawmakers’ decisions concerning the scope of the rights that they
create. Recognition of that fact raises serious questions concerning the viability of
judicially devised exceptions to the bar on third-party standing. This Article has attempted to answer some of those questions. Whether or not one agrees with the specific answers that I have proposed, we must think seriously about those questions as we
consider third-party standing “doctrine’s proper place in the standing firmament.”374
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